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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1985 the Minister of Justice, Hon . Geoffrey Palmer presented a White Paper on a Bill 
of Rights for New Zealand (hereafter the "White Paper" 1). Included as part of the White 
Paper were Articles 4, 25 and 28 . Article 4-The Treaty of Waitangi was intended to 
recognise and affirm "the rights of the Maori people under the Treaty of Waitangi". 
Article 25- El?forcement of Guaranteed Rights and Freedoms allowed persons whose 
rights and freedoms had been violated to seek a remedy through a competent court. 
Article 28-Entrenchment intended to elevate the status of the proposed Bill of Rights to 
supreme law. 
Judging by submiss ions made to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (hereafter 
the "Committee"), the New Zealand public was overwhelmingly opposed to the 
introduction of this Bill. Despite such opposition the New Zealand Em of Rights Act 
1990 (hereafter the "NZBORA") was enacted into New Zealand law with the above 
Articles notable omissions. During a seminar conducted at Victoria University in 1996, 
Professor Margaret Bedggood2 submitted the view that the issue of Palmer's White Paper 
needs to be revisited . This paper intends to undertake a part of Bedggood's submission. 
The major focus of this paper concerns the incorporation of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(hereafter the "Treaty") into an entrenched Constitution. The Committee submitted that 
Maori objected to incorporation3 of the Treaty with the result being exclusion of Article 4 
from the NZBORA. This paper challenges that submission, however in order to provide a 
relevant backdrop it will consider briefly the issues surrounding entrenchment and the 
Canad ian movement to a Constitutional framework. This paper will then examine the 
1 f or the puq)()ses or thi s paper, reference lo the While Paper refers to the drn!l Bill of Rights as presented by 
Palmer rnther tlwn the While Paper it seli'. Meaning tha t it denotes what would have been the NZBORA had 
Palmer's <lrnrt ha<l been acccptecl. 
2 Dean of Law, Waikato University. 
3 Interim Report of the .lust ice and Law Refonn Committee !11q11it:v i1110 1!te IT'lti1e Paper: A Bill of Rigltts for New 
Zealand ( 1987) An ffi I 8/\. 
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submissions made to the Committee and responses to a questionnaire sent to various 
Maori on the issue of incorporation of the Treaty. The intention of the questionnaires and 
ultimately this paper, is to gauge whether Maori views on this issue have changed 
ostensibly in the ten or so years since this issue was mooted sufficient to state that 
incorporation of the Treaty is now an appropriate action. 
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Part One 
II. ENTRENCHJVIENT 
A. Introduction 
The White Paper as Palmer saw it, was to provide a "mechanism by which governments 
are made more accountable by being held to a set of standards". 4 Those standards 
included the impo11ance of fundamental rights; protecting an abuse of power by the 
Executive or Legislative arms of government; and providing a remedy in the event of a 
breach. The watchdogs of these standards were to be the courts. It would become their 
role to ensure that an enactment of the Legislature or an action of the Executive was 
consistent with those fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA. 
By its very nature a Bill of Rights (hereafter a "BOR"5) , though affirming the existence of 
such rights and freedoms, is in a sense a last resort tool. Palmer, whilst adhering to the 
notion that "[n]o Government and no Parliament we are likely to have in New Zealand in 
the foreseeable future are going to attempt to sweep away basic rights"6 was yet moved 
to stating that "[t]hat is not the real point ... What is in point is the continual danger- the 
constant temptation for a zealous Executive - of making small erosions of these rights."7 
The corollary is that the accountability mechanism of a Bill of Rights creates a burden or 
fetter upon the exercise of State sovereignty. In the event of a government who found the 
conditions of a BOR too prohibiting, there needed to be a provision that would provide 
protection and enforcement for the Act . 
4 M Ch..::n and Sir G Palm..::r Public La ll' i11 .\'ew "!..ea lcmd: Cases, .\ fa terials, Co111111e11ta1)1 and Q11estio11s .. 
(Auckland , 0:-.:loru Uni versity Press, 1993) --1--1 5. 
5 Reference to n Bill o!'Rights in thi cont..::xt is intended to apply to such Acts in a generic sense. 
6 ,·1 Bill of Rigltts f or New Zealand: .·1 Wlt ite Paper 1985 AJJJR A6, para . 4.8. See also above 114, 447. 
7 Sec above 11 6, para 4.9 - 4.10. 
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B. Form Of E1~force111ent And Protect;on 
1. Full entrenc!tment 
This mechanism can take three different forms: full entrenchment, semi-entrenchment and 
ordinary legislation. 8 Full entrenchment is (possibly) the extreme end of the spectrum and 
is seen in countries such as the United States, Ireland and Germany. Under this option the 
court has power to strike down primary legislation. It acts effectively as the final trump 
over legislative making powers. 
Article VI of The United States Constitution provides :9 
"The Constitution. and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof: and all treaties made or shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." 
It also provides that all federal, state, and local officials are required to take an oath to 
support the Constitution . This means that state governments and officials cannot take 
actions or pass laws that interfere with the Constitution, laws passed by Congress, or 
treaties. 
The US Constitution was : 10 
'' interpreted. in 1819. as giying the Supreme Court the power to invalidate 
any state actions that interfere ,rith the Constitution and the laws and treaties 
passed pursuant to it. That po,,·er is not itself e:xplicitly set out in the 
Constitution but was cleclarecl to e:xist by the Supreme Court in the decision 
of 1\ fnr/)//r\J \I, .\ fndison." 
As we will see below, what was envisaged for ew Zealand under the White Paper was 
something analogous but still of a lesser force than the United States framework . 
2. Semi-en trench men t 
Semi-entrenchment provides that violation of a BOR is actionable in the courts. Though 
the courts to a certain degree have the same ability to strike down State actions as in full 
8 F. Klug nnd .I. Wad ham ···Democratic· cntrcnrhmcnl or a Bill or RightsLibcrly's proposals'' [ 1993] Public Law 
579, 579. 
9 See The Supremacy Clause: U.S. Constitution, art. Vl, § 2. 
10 Legal lnfonnati on Institute Co11s1iw1io11al Lclll' ,\ /a/ erials http://www. Jaw.comcl l .cclu/ topics/constitutional.html. 
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entrenchment jurisdictions, there is a critical limitation of their power through the 
inclusion of a 'notwithstanding' clause. 
Section 33 of the Canadian Cha11er of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter the "Charter") 
provides a classic example of this type of provision. In particular s.33(1) states: 
(1) Parlimnent or the legisla111re of a province may expressly declare in an 
Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the A et or 
a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in 
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. [Emphasis added] 
Therefore though the Canadain Courts are able to strike down Acts, the State Parliament 
is yet able to pass legislation provided that it expressly intends to breach the Charter. 
3. Ordinmy legislation 
The NZBORA is an example of a BOR with mere 'ordinary legislation' status. The 
NZBORA was passed without an entrenching provision and without a provision in 
relation to its status as supreme law. 11 Instead "the Attorney General is the guardian of 
the Bill of Rights, with responsibility for bringing to the House of representatives' 
attention any 'legislative' breaches." 12 
Under this regime a BOR has a limited role as an interpretative aid for Acts of 
Parliament . Furthermore in Acts such as the NZBORA, the courts are prohibited from 
refusing to apply any provision of an Act merely because it is inconsistent with the Bill. 13 
This is the same approach as that seen in Danish and Belgium constitutional frameworks. 
C Supreme Law And Article 1 
The White Paper was intended by Palmer to be both supreme law through Article 1 and 
protected from interference through Article 28. A11icle 1 stated: 
This Bill of Rights is the supreme law of New Zealand. and accordingly any 
law (including e.\isting la\\") inconsistent \\·ith the Bill shall. to the e.\tent of 
the inconsistency. be of no effect. 
11 Article I or the proposed Bill would hnve clcvnted this to supreme lnw. 
12 Sec nbove n 8, 580. 
13 Sec section 4( I) .Ne 11• ZC'aland 8ill o/J?ig/11s .·/er /990 . 
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Many submissions suppor1ed the elevation of the White Paper to supreme law. For 
example it was Shaw and Elkincl's view that a "truly effective Bill of Rights requires it to 
have the status of supreme law." 1-1 
What is interesting in relation to the so-called supremacy of this law was that Article 1 
would hypothetically allow a proposed Act to stand because the provision would only be 
applied to the parts of the proposed Act inconsistent with the White Paper. Shaw et al 
commented that : 15 
"' ll]he words ' to the extent of the inconsistency ' mean that, where part of a 
law is inconsistent ,rith the Bill of Rights and part of the law is not, the 
inconsistent law may be se\'ered from the rest of the statute which will 
remain in force: provided. of course, the absence of the inconsistent part does 
not impair the operation or substantially alter the meaning of the whole." 
Therefore, for such inconsistent legislation all is not lost because Article 23 required that 
legislation to be read consistent with the White Paper and Article 3 allowed for 
'justifiable limitations '. 
I submit that this poses an interesting question about the nature of supreme law as 
envisaged by Article 1. Is supremacy measured by the White Paper's ability to strike 
down an inconsistent law, or is a BOR supreme because all other Acts must be first 
measured against it? If it is the former then one might suggest that Article 1 was not 
sufficiently supreme given the need to read it in conjunction with an Ar1icle 23 and 3. If 
the latter, then supremacy can arguably include any number of Acts. 
Notwithstanding this question, essentially the White Paper - with the inclusion of Article 
1 - would have amounted to a constitutional document of a lesser force than the 
American Constitution, which as previously noted, inheres in the Court power to strike 
down an Act in its entirety. At the same time the White Paper would have been 
something more than a semi-entrenchment regime because it contained no provision 
14 .1.13. Elkind and /\. Shaw··/\ Stnndnrd For .Justice: /\ Critica l Commentary on the Proposed Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand·· al 52 in S11b111issio11s 011 .·I Bill of /?ights for Ne11• ZC'ala11d: A fl'liite Paper I "o/11me 3 (Victoria 
University, Vh:llington, 1985) Submission 186. 
15 Sccaboven 14,270. 
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analogous to a 'notwithstanding clause'. 
D.Parlia111entary Sovereignty And Article 28 
The specific use of the words 'no provision of this Bill of Rights' in Article 28 16 of the 
White Paper would have had the effect of double entrenchment, in that both the 
NZBORA and the entrenching provision were protected from being easily changed. This 
would have rendered the NZBORA unique in terms of New Zealand statutes, because 
there is no other example of double entrenchment, and along with Article 1 such 
entrenchment would have enhanced the NZBORA status as supreme law. 
The submissions in opposition to entrenchment predictably concerned the issue of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which itself can be broken into two parts. The first was in 
relation to the purported binding of future Parliaments and the other concerned the 
appropriateness and indeed ability of the courts to ensure that Parliament adheres to the 
standards posited in a BOR. 
1. 'P'arliament or 'p 'arliament 
The notion of parliamentary sovereignty expounded by Dicey was "a sovereign power 
cannot, whilst retaining it sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular 
enactment."t 7 Entrenchment is a procedural, or manner and form limitation on future 
Parliaments. That is, one Parliament purporting to bind another by implementing the 
manner in which an action can be taken and also the form that, for example, subsequent 
10 Article 28 prol'1ded the lolloll'ing. 
No prol'ision or this Bill of' rights shnll be rcpenled or nmended or in nny wny nffected 
unless the proposnl 
(n) ls pnssed by n majority or 75 percent of nil the members or the House of 
Representatil'es nnd contains nn e:--press declarntion that it repeals, amends, 
or nlkcts thi s Bill of Rights; or 
(b) Ilns been cnITied by a mnjority of the l'nlid votes cast at a poll of the electors 
for the ]louse ofRepresentntil'es; 
And , in either case, the Act making the chnnge reci tes that the required majority has 
been obtnined. 
17 A Clwnder '"Sovereignty, Relcrenda , and the l~ntrenchment of a United Kingdom Dill of Rights" (1991-92) IOI 
Yale L..T . 457 , -163 . 
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legislation must take. An attempt to allay this concern was made in paragraph 7 of the 
White Paper. 18 
"In requmng a special procedure for enacting or repealing a statute, 
Parliament is not binding its successors but only redefining "Parliament" or 
laying down a new procedure for a certain purpose." 
Commentators have accepted "that Parliament could not fetter its powers, yet reflected 
that the sovereignty problem existed only so long as parliament continued to exist in its 
present form." 19 So whilst Palmer's redefinition of Parliament may arguably have still 
begged the sovereignty question, it is a question that can only be asked under the status 
quo. In the event of the White Paper being passed through the House, the status quo 
would have ended and Parliament effectively redefined. Palmer's comment is echoed by 
H.L.A. Ha11 who stated that "Parliament has not 'bound' or 'fettered' Parliament or 
diminished its continuing omnipotence, but has 'redefined' Parliament and what must be 
done to legislate. "20 
Chander along similar lines notes that the English cou11s are recognising the pre-eminence 
of European Community law over domestic law.21 Through the UK Parliament's 
ascension to the E11ropea11 Com1111111ities Accession Act 1972 (hereafter the "ECAA") 
Community law takes a priority over domestic. This Act provides effectively manner and 
form restrictions over Acts made before and after the ECAA. It instructs the Courts to 
adopt an interpretation according to principles laid down by the European Court of 
Justice .22 Does this redefine Parliament? 1 submit that it does not. What the UK 
Parliament has demonstrated is a willingness to see its own sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of future UK Parliaments fettered by European Community law. In other 
words in order to legislate in the future, the UK Parliament must be mindful of European 
18 Sec nbove 11 6, parn . 7. 12 
10 P./\. .J oseph Co11stit11t io11al a11d .·ld111i11is tm 1i ,·e / ,a 11• i11 .\ 'e 11• Zmla11d (The Lnw Book Company Ltd, New South 
Wnles, 1993) 103. 
20 See above 11 17, -1 0-l . 
21 Sec above 11 17, -1 67. 
21 Sec above 11 22 , -1 67. In .\ /aca rthys U d I' S111i1I, [ 198 1] I QIJ 180, 
The Court or /\ppcals found lh,11 the Community law standard for dclcnnining sex 
di scriminati on in \\'ages took priority over the domestic law standard . 
11 
Community law. 
It should be noted that Shaw et al considered this redefinition or 'self-embracing' 
doctrine as "controversial. .. [and]. .. not universally accepted". 2
3 This is supported by 
other commentators who note that "[t]he suggestion of the 'new view' finds only tenuous 
support in the Commonwealth cases heard by the Privy Council."
2
.i However I believe the 
doctrine has some merits particularly if we consider the increasing importance of the 
United Nations and international law upon the domestic sphere. This importance is 
evidenced by the long title of the NZBORA which states: 
(a) To affirm. protect. and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in Ne,,· Zealand: and 
(b) To affirm .\Tew Zealand's co111111itment lo the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. [Emphasis added] 
Clearly what this demonstrates is that though not a statement of such unequivocal 
accession as seen in the ECAA, the long title of the NZBORA indicates an 
acknowledgement by the New Zealand Parliament that restrictions on sovereignty are a 
possible if not practical consideration . New Zealand still has a supreme Parliament, but 
eventually some consensus as to the effect of an entrenched Constitution will need to be 
reached as the impetus for such an Act gains momentum. 
23 Sec uhovc n 1--1 , 277: See nl so In terim Report or the .Justice nnd Ln\\' Rcfonn Select Committee, !11q11i1y i11to the 
White Paper: .·I /]ill o//?iglitsjc;r .\'ell' 7.mlw11! ( I 987) /\.11 IR I 8/\ 2--1 0. 
24 Sec above n 17. --169 . 
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2. Power to the judiciary 
In relation to the second ground, the traditional model of parliamentary sovereignty saw 
that the legislature made law and the judiciary applied law. 25 This concept was seen as the 
"essence of British democracy"26 because the people voted for Parliament therefore 
Parliament was seen as carrying out the will of the people. The accompanying objection 
was that it was not for a non-elected judiciary to restrain Parliament . 
The Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (hereafter the 
"Interim Report") notes that the power given to the judiciary "was clearly the principal 
reason for opposition to the proposal [ of the Bill]".27 A full one-third of the submissions 
cited this concern as reason not to pass the draft bill. 
The question to be asked is whether such concerns are well founded. If the ability to 
strike down law is the same as making law then cutting rain-forests is an exercise in 
conservation. The increased powers of the judiciary mean only that there is an 
enforcement mechanism to their interpretation of a law. 
There was also the fact that not only is the judiciary not elected, but also they are not 
representative of a typical sample of New Zealanders. The New Zealand Law Society 
notes that consideration of the Bill would mean rule by an elite few. 28 They state that 
"judges then are selected from an extremely small pool of talent, from a very small 
minority of a very small minority."29 Clearly there is no easy answer to this concern 
except perhaps to point to decisions that are made every day in the New Zealand courts. 
Has the fact that judges represent a selective sample of the citizenry impaired their ability 
25 Restntemcnt or this concept is mnde notll'ithstnnding comments made by D Knight ·'Judges ns 'Law-Makers' ?" 
[Public Lm1 , Mi1sters Seminar (unpublished), 19971 to ll'hich I agree tlrnt the judiciary does indeed make law. 
1-Iowel'er the rnntc:,,;t in ll'hich thcl' ·make' In\\' is 1101 itself' neccssnrily seen as an affront to parliamentary 
so\'erci!.mt y. 
20 M -M,;ndcl The Charter a/Rights and the J,egalizatia11 a/Palitics in Canada (Wn ll & Thompson, Inc., Ontario, 
1989)-1. 
27 Sec abo\'c 11 3, 8. 
28 S11b111issia11.· 0 11 .·I /3il/ a/Rights/or 1\'ew Zea land: .·I 1111ite Paper 1·at11111e 3 (Victoria University, Wellington, 
1985), Submission 1-10. 
29 Sec abol'c 11 28, p.3, para. 4.2. 1. 
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to adjudicate fairly and in the interests of the New Zealand public to date? I leave that for 
the reader to draw conclusions on their own. 
It was also the Law Society's view that judges were better trained to deal with the black 
letter law and did not have the training to deal with essentially policy issues. 30 Having the 
benefit of retrospect, I submit that the judiciary has through the subsequent litigious 
activity following the passing of the BOR, proved itself more than apt at dealing with 
policy considerations. 
For example in the Raigen/" 1 decision the Cow1 held that an effective remedy was 
appropriate even though the Bill has no specific remedy provision. The Court stated 
that: 32 
'"the Bill of Rights was pnsscd to affirm, protect, and promote human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand and to affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Co,·enant on Ci\'il and Political Rights. 
From these purposes. it ,\'as implicit that effcctiYe remedies should be 
available to any person " ·hose Bill of Rights guarantees were alleged to have 
been Yiolntcd. ·· 
In the case of Noor/" the cou11 was persuaded by counsel to adopt the meaning of 
'arbitrary' from international jurisprudence particularly in relation to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as opposed to the black letter meaning from the 
dictionary or from an English decision - arguably another example of policy v black 
letter. 
3. PI a 1111 et! obsol esce11ce 
As a final note on the objections to the NZBORA, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson states that 
his greatest objection was the future being bound to "today's conceptions of human 
rights" .3.i It was Borland's submission that the English common law: 35 
30 Sec above n 28, p.3 , para. -1.2.2 . 
31 Simpson v .-IC [/3oige111 ·.1· Case J ( 199-1) I I !RN;, -12 . 
32 Sec above n 3 I, -16 . 
33 Noori V Police: C11rm11 \' Police I 1990 - 92 I I N/,norm 97. 
3
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1 Sec above S11h111issio11s 011 .·I /Jill c~/'l?ig/11s jcJr .\'e11 ' l.ea la111/: .-1 1/'hite Paper I ·otunre -I (Victoria University, 
Wcllinglon , 1985) Submission 216W. 
35 Sec above n 3-1 , Submission 319W. 
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"by it's very nature, is a li\'ing organism constantly changing and adapting to 
changing conditions[.] It is not a fixed immutable code 'written on tablets of 
stone' , that will become obsolete and irrelevant within fifty years[.]" 
It might be curious to wonder whether the notion of fundamental rights as presented 
within the White Paper would change ostensibly with the passage of time? However even 
in the event that fundamental rights contained in the White Paper were not sufficiently 
encompassing, the wording of Article 22 would have applied to broaden the scope of the 
Act. 
Article 22 provided that: 
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by 
reason only that the right or freedom is not guaranteed or is guaranteed to a 
lesser extent by this Bill of Rights. 
Wording such as an 'existing right ' specifically presupposes that there might be additional 
rights not contained in the White Paper. That being the case it shall not then be sufficient 
to consider non-inclusion in the White Paper or its enacted replacement as reason to 
derogate from the right. 
Though semantic, the above interpretation is consistent with the approach taken by the 
international community in relation to Article l (1 / 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Ri ghts (hereafter the "Covenant"). Nowak notes that use of the word 
' have ' instead of ·shall have' ''was consciously selected by the Working Party in the 3d 
Committee of the [General Assembly]."37 It is from this wording that one can imply 
Article 1 of the Covenant as per1aining to a continuing right rather than a right created by 
political recognition . 
So too with the rights and freedoms contained in the White Paper (and codified in the 
NZBORA) . Parliament was not attempting to ciuantify these rights as being only those 
3
" J\rticlc I ( I) provides: 
All peoples /rave the right or self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
free ly determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural dc\'clopment. 
37 Dr. iur. cl habil. M. No\\'ak U. ,\'. Co l'1'11a11t 01 1 CiFil and Political Rights: CCPR Com111e11tw)' (N.P Engel, 
Arlington, 1993) 15 . 
15 
contained m the draft (or final Act).Instead, the White Paper as supreme law would 
attach to itself the overarching intention to protect rights and freedoms. It is this 
protection which is set in stone as opposed to the actual rights themselves. 
E. SU 111111 {I ,y 
Entrenchment is a mechanism through which an Act is elevated from ordinary law to 
something of a higher status. Through provisions such as Article 1 of the White Paper, 
this status can be raised to the level of supreme law. New Zealanders voiced 
overwhelming opposition to the White Paper, yet by virtue of its enactment one must 
assume that this was interpreted as being opposition to enactment of a supreme Act 
rather than a BOR per se. What we currently have in this country is the NZBORA, 
ordinary legislation which purports to provide an interpretative mechanism for the New 
Zealand government, but which has no compelling element save the goodwill of the State. 
Given the predominantly negative public response, the reader must be left to wonder why 
anyone might suggest it appropriate to revisit the White Paper. Notwithstanding the 
submission of Bedggood, where is the mandate for such a proposition? Clearly the 
desired ideal of the White Paper was to introduce an Act that would set in stone 
protection for the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this country. It was 
against the possibility of a Government whose intention is to erode the rights and 
freedoms ofNew Zealand citizens that the White Paper was drafted. Yet what we have is 
far short of that ideal. 
It is the submission of this paper that New Zealand will move to an entrenched 
Constitutional framework , though as we will see in Pa,1 Four, what form the framework 
will take is still to be debated . The Canadian model is something that many commentators 
are attributed to preferring over our own38 though some Maori commentators would 
reject even this in relation to indigenous status. 
38 Sec above n 8, 3-11. 
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Part Two of this paper examines how Canada became a Constitutional monarchy. In 
submitting that New Zealand is likely to follow the Canadian model it is important first to 
consider how the Cha11er of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter the "Charter") came to be 
enacted. explains the pre-Constitution political environment; the incremental approach 
from a Federal Bill of Rights to entrenched Constitution; and then the entrenchment of 
the Canada Act 1982. 
17 
Part Two 
III. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE: FROl\1 BILL OF RIGHTS 
TO ENTRENCHED CONSTITUTION 
A. The Pre-Constitution Political Environment 
With both French and English colonial history dating to the 1600's, Canada since 1867 
has existed as a self-governing "Dominion" of the British Empire. Its initial Constitution 
was a British Statute, the British North America Act /867 (also called the Constitution 
Act 1867). This statute divided law-making powers between the federal and provincial 
governments39 and placed Constitutional amendment powers over Canada with the UK 
Parliament. 
Mandel notes that prior to the enactment of The Canada Act and the Charter of Rights 
and Fi·eedoms 1982, Canadian democracy did not command great respect.
40 The people 
of Canada only saw politicians once every four years during an election, otherwise the 
39 The Worlch1·i<le Legal Informat ion Association Co11adia11 Co11s1i1u1iona/ Law http://www.wwlia.org/ca-
const.hlm 
Federal Government: peace, or<ler and good government laws in all areas not 
specifically given lo Provinces in the Constitution Act. 1867; regulation of trade and 
commerce; unemployment insurance; taxation; postal service; census and statistics; 
military an<l dcicnsc matters; navigation an<l shipping; seacoast and inland fi sheries; 
money making an<l banking; \\'eights and measures; bills of exchange (e.g. cheques); 
bankruptc,·; patents; copyright ; Indians; marTiage and divorce; criminal law including 
penitentiaries. 
Pro1·incial Go1·crn111cnt: ta\ation for provincial pu1voses; hospitals: municipalities; 
store and alcohol licenses: solc111n1zation or maniage; property and civil rights; 
administration or justice: education: all matters of a private or local nature; 
nonrenell'able natural resources ( e.g .. forestry and hydro-electricity). 
Court decisions and national negotiations have added or clarified these powers. For example, the federal 
responsibility for unemployment insurance \l'Hs the result of national negotiations. The exact delimitation between 
the federal government's responsibility for "marriage" and the provincial responsibility for the "(solenmisation] of 
maJTiage" continues to be a matter of Court decisions even today. 
40 M. Mandel TJ,e CJ,arler of Rig/1/s and 1/w Lega /iza1io11 of Poli1ics in Canada (Wall and Thompson, Toronto, 
1989) sec generally Chapter I. 
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dominant principle was "one-dollar-one-vote" as opposed to the popular adage "one-
person-one-vote."-11 Highly paid lobbyists, ownership of the media, busy signals on the 
telephone, low level bureaucrats with "standard forms and unchangeable procedures"
42 
contributed to an environment conducive to the cry "power to the people" through the 
"right to appeal to the cou11s". 43 
In the 1970s additional regional strains arose: 4-1 
"as residents of lhe rapidly de\'eloping western provinces (especially oil-rich 
Alberta) chafed under a federal system that, in their view, deprived them of 
lhe full benefits of their resources. Such controYersies pointed lo lhe need for 
reform of the federal-proYincial PO\\"er arrangement and led to agitation for 
lhe patriation of the conslitution." 
B. .!11dicial Proactivity 
Though based upon the Westminster precept of parliamentary sovereignty, the Canadian 
courts could hardly be accused of reticence in terms of its Constitution-like decisions 
prior to 1982. Under the Co11stit11tio11 Act 1867 the court had the power to "defeat 
legislative initiatives they disagreed with" _-1 5 The criterion for court intervention required 
that there had to be some jurisdictional violation. For example :-1
6 
-- 111 I Union Collie,y, 1899. 585]. the Pri,·y Council struck down racist 
proYincial law pro\'iding Lhat ·no Chinamen shall be employed in any mine.' 
Thal they did so on purely jurisdictional grounds, however, is underlined by 
the fact th:11 the racist provisions of the federal Chinese Immigration Act 
1886 were used in the case to demonstrate the exclusi\"e federal jurisdiction 
O\"er ·Naturalization and Aliens .. ,, 
During the 1930's and using only the jurisdictional criteria, the courts "held their own 
reactionary fight against regulation ."-17 Put simply the Courts dispatched of a number of 
Federal Acts-18 containing regulatory measures. This culminated in a 1938 Supreme Court 
41 Sec above n 40 , 2. 
42 Sec above n ..JI . 
43 Government ofCannda The Co11sri1111io11 and fou ( 1982 ) Ottawa. 
44 The Concise Columbia T:11cyclopedia (Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1991) 
http://www. p1It.cdu/-mnws155/cnirnda/h istory. htm I 
45 Sec above 11 40, 5. 
46 Sec above n .JO. 6, at note I . 
47 Sec above n .JO, 7. 
48 /3c'1111er1 Ne 11• Deal I 935: l :'111p/0_1·111C'11r oil(/ Sociol !11s11ra11ce .·lcr I 935: Na rural Prod11c1s .-lcr, The Weekly Res/ 
i11 /11d11srria/ U11<iffraki11g1· .·/er. '/J1e .\ li11i11111111 11 ·oges .·/er and The Li111irario11 ofl /011rs of Jf"ork Ac! 1936-37. 
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decision,-19 which held that provincial legislation (though not federal legislation) could be 
judged on merits if it were bad enough. This was comparable to the civil libertarian 
approach of the US and the assessment of such legislation was taken without the aid of a 
BOR. 
C. Tire Canadian Bill Of Rights 
Though judicial activism was evident prior to WWII, there were other events such as 
treatment of Canadians of Japanese origin and Nazi atrocities which purportedly 
provoked more debate for the need to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. In 194 7 
a petition with 500,000 names was tabled which supported a BOR. .With the advent of 
the cold war, the emotive argument presented was that in the United States, communism 
could not be introduced without a change to the Constitution, but under the Westminster 
political structure, it could be introduced by will of the present Government. 
Two major stumbling blocks to the BOR surfaced: that a BOR would interfere with 
provincial jurisdiction; and, the Premier of Quebec, who argued that until Canada was 
able to amend its own constitution thus reaching "full maturity", no discourse on a BOR 
was possible. As a result of the continuing debate three decisions of the Supreme Court 
during the l 950's found it warming to the idea of constructing its own constitutional 
BOR, though they never quite achieved the majority necessary for an implicit BOR. 
With the influence of a post war United States being felt everywhere and the election of 
the Progressive-Conservative government, the Canadian Bill of Rights (hereafter the 
"CBOR") was introduced. The CBOR was applicable only to federal government, which 
though it may have overcome the first stumbling block, remained a position criticised by 
legal academics. 
In a view that typifies a judicial activism approach, Laskin, Faculty of Law of the 
University of Toronto, who would later as Chief Justice of Canada be connected closely 
4
'' R!! .-1/herw S tatutes j 1938] S.C.R 100. 
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with the entrenchment project, stated that :50 
··1tJhc proposed Bill is unfo1tunatc in its limited application to the 
federal govcrnmcnt ... It would be better that no Bill be proposed so that 
the common law tradition be mai,1t:iincd through the unifying position 
of the Supreme Cou1t of Canada. And better too, in such case, to 
continue unaided in developing constitutional doctrine which has 
already pointed to legal limitations on the legislative encroachment on 
civil liberties. " 
D. Tlte Constitution Act 1982- Finally. 
The debate continued over Canada ' s inability to amend its constitutional arrangement 
without an application to the United Kingdom because it was an Act of the British 
Parliament . In 1978, Prime Minister Trudeau introduced a Bill that would be applicable 
to both federal and provincial government, but only at their option. The central feature of 
Bill C-60 was a constitutional Charter of Rights . The rallying cry was for Canadian unity. 
This was in pa11 due to Quebec's call for independence and though Trudeau's Liberal 
government was defeated in May 1979 it was ' unexpectedly ' back in office in February 
1980. 
With a majority government Trudeau began the final push for an entrenched Constitution. 
He had only two pre-conditions: "a strong federal government and a Charter with 
language rights: we consider everything else to be negotiable."51 There ensued a 
predictable lack of agreement between the provinces, but the major point of contention 
was Trudeau 's second pre-condition. 
Manitoba for example had a "relatively large and linguistically mistreated French 
minority. "52 Any constitution that included recognition of minority or language rights had 
the corollary of creating a responsibility upon the particular government. Yet 
paradoxically it was Trudeau's intention to entrench English language rights in order to 
50 Sccnbo\'cn-10, 1-1 . 
51 
/ louse o(Co111111011s /)eho tes Mui· 21, 1980: 126-1. 
52 R Shcpjxml and M Vulpy The fk1tio110/ Deol: The Fi"ght /or a Ca 11w lia11 Co11stit11tio11 (fleet Books, Toronto, 
1982 ). 
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have a Cha11er claim against Quebec. 53 
When no unity was forthcoming, Trudeau attempted by Resolution of Parliament to 
unilaterally ask the United Kingdom to repatriate the constitution. Opponents54 to the 
Resolution focused their efforts on three fronts ; parliamentary, diplomatic and legal. In 
relation to the latter of the two there was diplomatic lobbying of British Parliamentarians 
that was so successful that representatives of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urged 
Ottawa to drop the Charter. It was suggested that particularly without the consent of the 
provinces, the Resolution would risk defeat in the British House of Commons. 55 Despite 
such 'interference' it was the legal front that proved to be the most decisive. 
The Supreme Court56 was presented with the issue of whether a convention existed that 
required provincial consent to patriate the constitution. Commentators submit that 
everyone knew such a convention existed but that it was extraordinary to refer the 
question to the courts. 57 The Cou11 upheld the convention stating in essence that though 
Trudeau's unilateral action was legal it was nonetheless unconstitutional. 58 The Court 
also noted that there was nothing it could do to interfere with what amounted to a "mere 
request by the Canadian Parliament to the UK Parliament."59 What the Court could not 
quantify was whether support from the provinces needed to be unanimous or a special 
majority. If it was special majority then what so11 of majority? 
In 1981 national polls confirmed that between 72 - 82% of the population surveyed 
supported the Charter. Eventually when only Quebec withheld consent and because the 
wording of the Supreme Cow1 decision was vague, it was considered that nine provinces 
would be a sufficient mandate to pursue the Constitutional change. An accord that would 
53 Sec above 11 .JO , 29-30 . 
54 Manitoba , Quebec and Ne\\' Foundla11d. 
55 Sir Anthony Kershaw in research for the UK Parliament had found that Parliament was"bound by historical 
practice to automatically on a request from Ottawa' ' to amend the constitution of Canada without the consent of the 
prov111ccs. 
56 RC'fere11ce re .-l111rndme111 of t!il! Co11stit11rio11 of Canada ( I 981) I 25 DLR (3rd) I . 
57 Sec above n 40 , 2..J . 
58 Sec above 11 19, 2..J3 . 
50 Sec above 11 .JO , 26. 
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become Canada's constitution was worked out between the federal and nine provincial 
governments then presented as a.fail accompli to Quebec's Premier. 
In 1982 the Canada Act 1982 (UK) was enacted by the British Parliament, which resulted 
in constitutional amendment powers residing in the Canadian government. Furthermore it 
stated that no Act of the UK Parliament shall extend to Canada as part of its law. The 
same Act was passed in Canada but called the Consti/11/ion Act 1982, and as per 
Trudeau's intention included the Canadian Charter of Rights and l•i·eedoms. 
E. S11111111ary 
I submit that whether we like it or not, New Zealand has closely mirrored certain aspects 
of the Canadian experience. For example Ne11 1 Zealand Co11stit11tion Act 1852, whilst 
establishing a representative legislature in this country contained s.68 which "provided 
that Bills for altering the Act be reserved for Her Majesty's assent and laid before both 
Houses of the British Parliament."
6° Consider too that the NZBORA is an Act analogous 
to the CBOR and thus the incremental approach of the Canadians, in which first a BOR 
and then an entrenched Constitution were enacted, can be a process mirrored in this 
country. It was originally intended for a supreme, entrenched statute to be enacted, 
therefore any revisitation of the White Paper issues must conclude that the Canadian 
approach bears some scrutiny . 
Post-Charter, commentators have decried that the power has not been transferred to the 
people but to the law profession. Mandel notes that the legal profession is not a "more 
democratic technique for resolving political issue"
61 because they attempt to hide the 
political nature of a decision through abstractions. "The Charter exalts courts even more. 
I think they should be cut down to size. That is why I wrote this book. I know we can do 
better than this ."62 
00 Sec nbovc 11 19, 88 . 
01 Sec nbove 11 40, ..J . 
62 Sec nbove 11 ..JO , :--. 
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He believes the Charter weighs heavily on the side of power and undermined popular 
movements effectively strengthening inequalities. For this he cites an example where in 
1985 an objection to cruise missiles was not even allowed to go to trial.
63 I submit the 
view that these concerns do not negate an entrenched constitution, rather they provide us 
with sufficient questions that need to be addressed when as New Zealanders we inevitably 
face the issue ourselves. 
63 OpC'ratio11 Dismantle et al. " Tlte Q11ee11 ( 1985) 18 DLR (--llh) --!81 Per Dickson J., Estey, Mcl11tyre, Chouinard 
and Lamer .I.I. , concurring: for appellants to be entitled to proceed to trial , their statement of claim must disclose 
facts, \\'hich, ii' taken ns tru..: , ll'ould slw11 th,11 the m:tion or the Canadian Government could cause an infringement 
of their rights under s. 7 or the Charter. The causal link between the actions or the Canadian Govenunent, and the 
alleged violation or appellants' rights under th..: Charter 11:1s too uncertain, speculative and hypothetical to sustain a 
cause of action. Thus, although decisions or the t'cdernl Cabinet are reviell'able by the courts under s. 32( I )(a) of the 
Charter, and the government bears a general duty to act in accordance with the Charter's dictates, no duty is imposed 
on the Canadian Government by s.7 of the Charter to refrain from pennitting the testing of the cruise missile. 
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Part Three 
IV. INCORPORATION OF THE TREATY 
A. Introduction 
The main issue of this paper 1s whether the Treaty should be incorporated into an 
entrenched Constitution . It was clearly Palmer' s intention that the Treaty be so 
incorporated yet in the final Act, amongst other omissions, no reference to the Treaty is 
found . 
The Committee stated that Maori were opposed to incorporation.
64 This section 
considers the substance of the so-called Maori opposition by first examining the 
submissions made to the Committee in relation to Article 4. The implication of this 
approach is that these submissions constitute the main backdrop against which exclusion 
would be justified . Though this may seem a little simplistic, it appears that other than 
anecdotal evidence including newspaper articles etc, there is very little else of sufficient 
authoritative status to warrant specific mention . As a result of that lack, this paper will 
consider responses to a questionnaires sent to various Maori individuals around the 
country. 
B. J\1aori Consultation 
1. Reasons for consultation wit!, A1aori 
Inclusion of the Treaty into the Bill was intended to have a threefold effect.
65 It was 
necessary for effective consensus because the Bill must also "embrace Maori."
66 Inclusion 
0
•
1 l111cr im l~cport or the Jusli <.:c nm! La11 Rclorm Co111miltcc !11q11i1:1 · i1110 the 117,ite Paper: .·I Bill of Righ1s for 
Nm Zea lm,d ( 1987) /\.II IR I 8/\. 
05 Sec nbovc 11 6. 
00 Sec nbovc 11 65. 
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would go towards remedying "past failure to honour fully the Treaty."
67 Finally, "no law 
or document that refused to give proper recognition to it could fairly claim to be a Bill of 
Rights for all New Zealanders."68 Despite this type of rhetoric there was no such 
recognition provided in the NZBORA. 
Though it is fair to note that any New Zealand citizen could make comments in relation 
to the White Paper, the views of Maori in pa1iicular were sought by both Sir Geoffrey6
9 
and the Committee. In their Interim Report, the Committee stated that:
70 
.. [i]n any event, in our view it \\'Ould be inappropriate to delete the 
provisions in the draft bill relating to the Treaty without consultation 
with the Maori people'' ... 
.. In our view, the views of the Maori community on the bill of rights 
proposal in general and the incorporation of the Treaty of Waitangi in 
particular cannot be said to be settled". 
From this statement it is clear that consultation with Maori was necessary in order to 
establish whether deletion of Article 4 was appropriate as opposed to inclusion. I am not 
suggesting that the government would have included the provision in the face of Maori 
opposition, but that if the A1iicle was to be excluded it would be as a result of opposition 
discovered through consultation. This statement of the Committee would therefore pose 
few problems were it not for the fact that it is notably silent as to the extent of 
consultation i.e. how far either party was expected to go in order to be able to assert that 
consultation had occurred. 
2. The extent of cons11 ltation 
The Committee noted that the Minister of Justice had established a Maori advisory group 
and further that if it was decided to delete 
"Articles 4 and 26 it would seem appropriate to include a provision to 
the effect that the bill docs not affect any of the rights of the Maori 
67 Sec nbovc 11 65. 
68 Sec nbovc n 65 . 
69 Sec nbovc n 3. 
70 Sec nbovc 11 69, 32 - 33 . 
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people under the Treaty ofWaitangi". 71 
The next comment is a brief explanation by the Committee m its Final Report on the 
White Paper as to why the Articles relating to the Treaty were omitted. 72 
"One re:-ison for including the Treaty is that it must be seen as an 
essential pa1t of any supreme constitutional law which might be 
enacted. As the bill recommended by the Committee would not be 
supreme law this reason no longer applies. Indeed, to include the Treaty 
might suggest that it is no more than an ordinary statute. Further, the 
Committee notes th:-it questions about compliance with the Treaty are 
incre:-isingly being addressed effectively by individual statutes, the 
Waitangi Tribunal , and the courts. For these reasons the Committee 
recommended against including an equivalent to a1tiele 4 of the White 
Paper draft. , 
I submit that this result gives rise to a number of questions. Is it reasonable to believe 
from the Committee's recommendation that: as a result of consultation, it was settled, 
that the Maori people, were opposed to the Treaty's incorporation into the Bill? If so, 
then we must assume that Maori had also settled on the view, that exclusion of Article 4 
(and 26) also precludes any reference to rights of Maori under the Treaty being included 
as part of such an important piece of legislation. 
An alternative question might then be asked about whether the existence of a Maori 
advisory group constitutes sufficient consultation? It is my submission that whilst such a 
group may form the starting point , the consultation process was inadequate. For the State 
to hold otherwise may go some way to understanding the approach to the signing of the 
Treaty, during which it is said that not all of the Maori Chiefs were signatories. More 
contemporarily the Sea lords deal signed by only 43 signatories representing 17 of the 75 
distinct Maori tribes in New Zealand. 
The Committee observed that "very few Maori availed themselves of the select 
committee process"73 and this constitutes a wonderful understatement. In relation to 
71 Sec above 11 70, 33. 
72 Final Report of the .lu~lice and Law Rclonn Committee 011 a T/1,ire Paper 0 11 a Bill of Righrs for New Zealand 
( 1988) A.TI lR I 8C. 
73 Sec nbovc n 3, 12-1 
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Article 4 the Committee received only four submissions from groups or individuals that 
identified themselves as Maori. 74 
'·We the descendants of Wi Parata - former Maori MP for Southern 
Maori in the New Zealand House of Representatives - object to the 
Treaty of Waitangi being incorporated in the Bill of Rights, because it 
docs not need ratifying. "75 
··The Ngati Tc Ata Trust opposes the Bill of Rights and wishes to be 
heard in support of thi s injcction."76 
'·The Huakina Development Trust opposes the Bill of Rights and wishes 
to be heard in support of this objection."77 
Submission 63 though much longer than the rest was making an entirely different point. 
This submission was prepared by the Heke Arahura Maori Komiti for what appears to be 
the Poutini Kaitahu iwi. Effectively they assert that sovereignty has always resided with 
their iwi havi ng never been surrendered by them to anyone. They viewed the inclusion of 
the Treaty as "a sinister move by an oppressive Pakeha dominated government". Sinister 
because they considered that: 
78 
"if the Treaty is included in a Bill of Rights, the Treaty which defines 
the original inhabitants of the islands of Aotearoa, will become 
entrenched in law, \\'hich means that "sovereignty " still being debated, 
is settled !emphasis added] , although the majority original inhabitant 
Maori tribes of Aotcaroa ,\'ere not part of negotiations on the Treaty or 
of the signing of the Treaty ofWaitangi·'. 
Whatever the common perception of sovereignty may be, it is clear that these submissions 
would not of their own weight constitute a mandate from Maori sufficient to imply 
wholesale opposition to inclusion. In fact two of them simply state that Maori (for 
reasons below) oppose the White Paper. 
7'1 Though I conlcss that thi s comment is based upon some rclcrence to Maori organisation titles or reference to 
whakapapa links. 
75 S11lm1is.1·in11s 011 .·I /3ill (?(' Rig/11s /or \'e11• '/,ea /and: .-1 /1'/,it e Paper I "n/11me 2 ( Victoria University, Wellington, 
1985) Submi ssion J 28Vl. 
70 Sec above 11 3-l , Submission 232 . 
77 Sec above 11 76, Submission 233. 
78 S11b111issions 011 .-1 /WI o//?ig/11s /or .\ 'e 11· '/,ea/and: .·1 111, ite Paper / 'o/11111e 1 (Victoria University, Wellington, 
1985) Submi ssion 63. 
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The Committee also noted that "the select committee process does not lend itself easily 
to customary Maori consultation processes".
79 From the result the Committee obviously 
chose to ignore its own observations in relation to consultation or lack of it. I would 
suggest that it is unreasonable under any circumstances to believe that four submissions 
and a Maori advisory group could constitute sufficient consultation. The next question is 
whether Maori and non-Maori were opposed to incorporation. 
C. T!te Submissions 
1. Re/el'(111t Statistics 
There were 43 1 submissions to the Committee: 
• 243 oppose the bill, 
• 84 oppose the right to life provision, 
80 
• 56 make other suggestions and 
• 35 support the bill . 
There were only four Maori submissions directly to the Committee otherwise information 
received by the Committee is second-hand. These submissions refer only to the White 
Paper not Article 4. However, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is enacted, Aliicle 14 
is now section 8, and any reference to the Treaty is nowhere to be seen. 
The nature of the so-called objections raised by Maori in relation to Miele 4 are outlined 
below. If the facts indicate (which they do not) that the Maori people objected to 
inclusion of the Treaty, then the statistics are a glowing example of the weight attached 
to Maori objections. That is, despite the fact that there was overwhelming opposition to 
the Bill it was still enacted. However if Maori did not object, then I submit that only 
logical conclusion is that the Treaty was sacrificed in order to demonstrate some sort of 
70 Sec above n 3: sec a lso S11lm1issio11s 011 .-1 /3ill o/ Rights /or Ne w Zealand: .-1 IVhite Paper Volume 5 (Victorin 
University, Wellington , 1985), Submission --12--1 per Jane Kelsey ... 
"The process o!' consu llntion and ca lling for subm issions is, itself, exclusive and 
tota ll y euroccntric'". 
80 Originnlh· /\ rt1cle 1--111011· s 8 .\'e1 1• 7.eolal/(l /3i/l o.f !?ights .·let 1990. 
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recognition of the will of the people in the face of an act of Parliament that was contrary 
to such will. 
2. The Kelsey Perspective 
Kelsey8' notes four Maori objections to the White Paper debate. The first is that the 
Treaty itself is a BOR for New Zealand, which I will address below. The second 
concerned the status of ordinary legislation which: 
.. in an electoral system of Pakeha majority rule where the bill could be 
amended by referendum or 75 percent parliamentary vote there was a danger 
of the treaty being rewritten ." 
I believe this objection is a proverbial ' red herring'. Under the Westminster doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty - which the NZBORA did not replace - Parliament is able to 
ignore or legislate contrary to the Treaty. In the event that the Treaty has been 
incorporated into a statute it is theoretically possible for Parliament to change the 
wording of the Treaty itself The relevant question - though outside the scope of this 
paper - is whether Parliament 11 101ild as opposed to whether it could? Indeed I submit that 
incorporation into the NZBORA would have actually decreased the [non-existent] 
likelihood of an alteration as opposed to making it vulnerable to unwanted interference. 
Kelsey's assertion also raises procedural questions. For example Anderson states:
82 
··As alrendy noted (pnrn 1.-L 1.6 nbo\·e). Art icle .i docs not e:-;pressly establish 
the Treaty as part of the .. supreme Jaw··_ but merely " lrecogniscsl and 
nffirms" the rights of the Mnori people uncler the Treaty. The two versions of 
Treaty arc, of course, contained in the Schedule. In terms of article .i, 
therefore. it is possible to argue thnt the Treaty. not being itself granted any 
precise lega l status but merely being as to one aspect ·'recognised and 
affirmed .. and been furthermore relegated to the Schedule, the docs not itself 
form p:irt of .. this Bill of Rights". 
If we take Kelsey's concern to its logical conclusion, that would mean by mere inclusion 
in a Schedule the 'governing' Act is now empowered to make substantive alteration to 
81 /\s citeJ by S./\. Shortall "Aboriginal Scll~Governmcnt in /\otearoa/Ncw Zealand: A View Through the 
CanaJian Lens" ( I 9%) l ,LM Thcsis, 135: .I. Kclscy .-1 Q11eslio11 o/ J /011011r?: Labo11r and 1/ie Treary 198-1 - 1989 
(Allcn & Un\\'in , Wdlington , 1990) 5..J. 
82 S11b111issio11s 011 .-1 l3ill o/Rigl,1s for Nell' Zealand: A 1171ile Papff Volume 5 (Victoria University, Wellington, 
1985) Submission 423 , 1-l , para. 2.3. 
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the 'mentioned' Act. Therefore a reference to the Electoral Act in the Schedule of the 
Crimes Act for example, would be sufficient empowerment to override its entrenchment 
clause. Jn this situation, I submit that Parliament could not rewrite the Treaty nor any 
other Act merely because it was included in the Schedule of the NZBORA. Though the 
intention of the White Paper was to incorporate the Treaty, it would be contrary to the 
status of a supreme Act and the purported importance attached to the Treaty by Palmer 
and the Committee, to then allow for such an easy process of change. 
The third objection concerned the interpretation of the Treaty in the Pakeha courts which 
had historically failed to uphold its gu arantees . Unlike Kelsey I have the benefit of 
NZBORA history on my side, during which Maori have shown themselves to be 
litigiously inclined . Since 1987 and the New Zealand Maori Council case
83 the Courts in 
my opinion have been the source of a number of favourable decisions in relation to Treaty 
claims. However that aside, some commentators suggest that Maori still have reason to 
be distrustful of the New Zealand Courts.8-1 Kelsey's final argument was that the Treaty 
by inclu sion will be subj ected to the limitations of Article 3 - now s 5 - which again I will 
address below. 
3. The Treaty As A Bill Of Rights 
The most authoritative submissions included in the five volumes of submissions made to 
the Select Committee on behalf of Maori was that of Manuka Henare.
85 Mr Henare was a 
representative of Maori from tv-10 hui held at the Turangawaewae marae in 1984 and 
1985 . Previously Sir James Henare had requested that the Maori Council of Churches 
organise these gatherings in order to "di scuss once and for all the Treaty of Waitangi" . 
The mandate of these hui comes not only from the organising group, but from the cross-
83 Ne ll' '/.ea /011d ,\ lao,·i C'o 1111cil ".·lllon ie1· Ge11eml [ I 987J I NZLR 6-11 . 
8
'
1 Scc/\ppcncl i\ . Q11es1ionnni re 2. 
8~ Nell' Zen lund Section or the ln1enu11ionul Commission or .I urists .. /\ Transcript or the Seminar on Bill of Rights: 
The Pros and Cons" (Parli nmen1 13 uil d1ngs, 10 Mm· 1985) 61. 
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section of Maori 'society' that were in attendance.
86 Mr Henare notes: 87 
.. We [the Maori Council of churches] convened a wider group of people 
which included Maori organisations like the 28'h Maori Battalion, the four 
Maori members of parliament. Macri university students, Maori Wardens, 
Maori \Vo men ' s Welfare League. Mc1ori \1Titers and artists, the New Zealand 
Maori Council. the race relations conciliator was involved and Mana 
Motuhake. c1long \\'ith all the Maori churches." 
Mr Henare states that on the proposed Bill of Rights the hui said that the "hui is 
suspicious of the passing of a Bill of Rights because we believe we already have one, i.e. 
the Treaty of Waitangi."88
 
The immediate question is whether the 'we' applies simply to Maori, or to all New 
Zealanders, including Maori? On the one hand it must apply to the former given the 
nature of the gathering; on the other hand it co11/d apply to the latter due to the nature of 
the Treaty. Whatever interpretation of 'we' one prefers, this comment is significant not 
because it supports the exclusion of A11icle 4 from the NZBORA, but because it objects 
to the White Paper itself But even this objection is qualified given that it was couched in 
terms of a 'suspicion' as opposed to 'rejection'. If we also consider 75 percent of the 
other Maori submissions voice no opposition to i11c/11sio11, but the White Paper itself 
Even though Maori did 110/ support the White Paper per se, in the event of the it being 
passed Maori would have preferred that the NZBORA still contain some reference to the 
Treaty. It seems anomalous to suggest that Maori could believe in the pre-eminent status 
of the Treaty as a BOR, and yet conclude that they would not or did not support the 
incorporation of Article 4 into a BOR. This is particularly true given that the White Paper 
purported to fulfil the same BOR function tlrnt Maori perceived the Treaty entailed. 
4 . .lust[fied Jn A Free And Democratic Society 
Kelsey notes that if the Treaty had been included into the Bill of Rights, it would have 
been subjected to the justifiable limitations provision. A11icle 3 now section 5 states: 
80 Sec [lbovc 11 S5, 63. 
87 Sec [lbovc 11 85 , 62 
88 Sec abol'c n 85. 65 
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S11hject to section -I of"this !3il/ of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights may be subject lo only such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Her view was that this Article amounts to "protection of the existing state"
89 and that 
there are aspects of the two societies (Pakeha and Maori) that are intrinsically 
incompatible. 
Though it is intuitively reasonable to believe Maori would object to this section, it 
certainly did not seem evident from the submissions. However as stated above if Maori 
uphold the Treaty as a BOR then to see it being made subordinate to this section would 
constitute a violation their ideological stance. If we accept that Maori did formulate this 
objection, then it appears to support the idea that inclusion was the preferable option to 
exclusion. The construction of this objection presupposes that some reference to the 
Treaty would be contained in the NZBORA 
We must also accept that it was open for the government to come back with an 
alternative arrangement which did not involve exclusion on this point we can again look 
to the Canadians. For example in the original draft of the Cha1ier, aboriginal peoples 
were mentioned in the same manner that minorities are referred to in our section 20 the 
NZBORA. The clause that is now section 26 of the Cha1ier stated:
90 
The guarnntee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be 
construed as denying the e.x istence of any other ri ghts or freedoms that 
e;-..;istcd in Caiwda inc/11di11g nnv rights or_/i-eeclo/1/s thnt pertnin to the nntive 
peoples of Cn11ndn. 
After a general outcry from the aboriginal groups section 35
91 was situated in Part II of 
89 Sec above n 79, 1-1 . 
90 The emphasis is added and now c.xcludcd from s 26 of the Charter. 
91 Section 35 or the Rights or the Abori ginal Peoples or Canada 
( I) The e.xisting aboriginal and lrent~' rights or the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and artirmcd. 
(2) In th is Act, "aboriginal peoples or Canada" includes the Indian, Inu it and Melis 
peoples or Canada. 
(3) For greater certainty, 111 subsection (I) "trea ty nghts" includes rights that now 
e.xist lw \Vay 01· 1und claims agreements or may be so acq uired . 
(-1) Not\\'ilhstand ing am· other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and trenty rights 
rcil:rrcd to in subsection (I) arc guaranteed equally to male and female persons. 
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the Charter which place it outside the override of section 33
92 and the "reasonable limits" 
of section 1.93 
The New Zealand government could have adopted this approach with little difficulty. If 
we consider also, that a number of non-Maori submissions spoke of the Treaty as being 
able to stand on its own merits,
9
~ then we are left with the idea that the Treaty has a 
special place that should appropriately be given special recognition. 
D. Summary 
The so-called Maori objections have been inappropriately used as the justification for 
excluding reference to the Treaty of Waitangi from the NZBORA. It was intended by the 
State that Maori should be consulted on the issue of the Treaty's inclusion and though 
the extent of this consultation was never clear, what is apparent is that the process was 
minimal at best. The corollary is that even the submissions I have posited may be 
premature given that the will of the Maori people in relation to this issue has not 
adequately been explored. 
Even if we accept the idea that this process was sufficient to establish the will of the 
Maori people, the response by the State has been to act in a contrary manner. Maori 
considered that the Treaty was a BOR for all New Zealanders. Three of the four 
submissions and the mind of the people from the Turangawaewae hui state categorically 
92 Section 33 of the Chnrter provides: 
(I) Parliament or the legislature or n province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of' the legislature, as the case mny be, that the Act or a provision 
lhereor sha ll operate 11ot11·ithstandi11g a provision included in section 2 or sections 
7 to 15 or this Charter. 
(2) J\n Act or a prol'ision oran /\cl in respect o!' 11hich a declaration made under this 
section is 111 effect sha ll hal'e such operntion as it \l'Ou!d hal'e but for the 
provision or this Charter ref'crred to in the declaration 
(3) /\ ckclnrntion made umkr subsection (I) shall cease to hnve effect lil'e years after 
it comes into force or on such e:IJ'Jier date as may be specified in the declaration 
(4) Parliament or the legislature ora province may re-enact a declaration made under 
subsection ( I). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect ofa n:-enactment made under subsection (4). 
93 This is identicnl in nl l mnleri nl respects to s 5 oC the .t-..'ew Zea /c111d !Jill a/Rights Act 1990. 
94 Sec Submissions 59: 60; 239, pnrn. 2.3; 373W pnra . 9: ~17. I confess though that the context of these 
submi :sions saw the Trent1· ns being excluded because or its slntus rather thnn included as I am proposing. 
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that Maori were opposed to a BOR - point blank. I have submitted that it would be 
anomalous to believe Maori would uphold the pre-emptive status of the Treaty and yet 
desire no reference to the Treaty in an Act that actually was a BOR. Saying no to the 
White Paper cannot be interpreted as saying no to Article 4. To do so derogates from the 
right Maori have to comment upon anything not pe11aining exclusively to Treaty or 
Maori issues. This in my opinion equates to a minimisation of the Maori view point and is 
contrary to the principle of partnership between Maori and the State that the Treaty is 
now understood to represent. This partnership "creates responsibilities analogous to a 
fiduciary duties"95 with a reciprocal responsibility "to act towards each other reasonably, 
'with utmost faith', commensurate with the duty which in civil law, partners owe to each 
other "96 Therefore Maori must be seen as have a view relevant to both members of the 
partnership and not merely to Maori . 
Ultimately the challenge for a new call to incorporation of the Treaty would depend upon 
ascertaining what Maori are saying on this issue. It would involve a process that 
incorporated the customary approach of Maori to these issues and then an accurate 
interpretation of this will. During the next section I consider the response to 
questionnaires sent to a select sample on the issue of incorporation . 
95 Ne ll' Zea land J\ luori Co11 11cil v .,lllom e\l Ge11 C'ra l [ 1987] 1 NZLR 6'1 1, 664 per Cooke P. 
96 Sccabovc n 19, 71 . 
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Part Four 
V. QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
A. Introduction 
There is a decidedly lack of authoritative sources that provide an indication of the nature 
of Maori objections to the incorporation. In order to gauge whether the situation has 
changed in the seven years from enactment to today, questionnaires were sent asking six 
questions. 
I. Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched 
Constitution? 
2. Should the Treaty of Wait<1ngi be incorporated into such <1 Constitution? 
Please outline reasons. 
3. Please e:--plain your answer. If you anS\\·crcd 'Yes' to Question 2. what 
form should such incorporation take? For c:--<1mplc should both English 
and M:1ori texts be incorporated') AltcrnntiYcly should we adopt Cooke's 
·principles' appronch? 
.i. There has been a common perception tlrnt Maori opposed incorporation 
of the Treaty into the Ne111 Zenln11d Bill of Rights Act 1990, when 
originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer. What is your understanding 
of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more paper if necessary. 
5. In your opinion, arc the abo\·e concerns still relevant in 1997? Please 
giYc reasons. 
6. Do you hm·c any further comments that may be rcle\'ant? 
There were fourteen written and one oral response to this questionnaire. It is not the 
intention of this paper to suggest that these responses constitute sufficient Maori 
consultation, but merely to provide a sample of Maori opinion. 
Like the Turangawaewae hui, the responses were submitted from Maori m a range of 
different vocations and ages . These included two college students - Darren Huatahi and 
Levi Mary-Church; a youth worker - Shaun Anderson; controversial author - Alan Duff; 
Members of Parliament - Hon . Tau Hen are and Hon. Alamein Kopu; Professor of Maori 
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Studies at Massey University - Mason Durie; Wellington lawyer - Maui Solomon; law 
lecturers - Annie Mikaere (Waikato University) and Anne Philips (Victoria University); 
community worker - Maraea McMillan on behalf of Te Kotahitanga Incorporated 
Society; and Auckland lawyers - Joe Williams and Moana Sinclair. The oral submission 
was from Moana Jackson of Nga Kaiwhakamarama I Nga Ture.97 
B. Should New Zealand /111ple111e11t An Entrenched Constitution? 
1. Submissions in favour 
Of the written submissions, ten were in favour of an entrenched Constitution being 
enacted . Sinclair for example emphatically states: "Yes! [A] written constitution like that 
of the US Constitution must be implemented in Aotearoa (NZ) with the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840 in a superior position ."
98 Philips suggests that: 99 
--it is important for the political stability of Nc,r Zealand that an entrenched 
Constitution is implemented. There is an c:,;pectation that such a Constitution 
would be implemented after careful research on other countries constitutions 
(such as Germany and Canada) and wide consultation within New Zealand." 
Professor Durie supports an entrenched Constitution because "[t]he constitutional 
conventions under which we operate are essentially an adaptation of Britain's former 
conventions ." 100 
Mikaere's support is conditional upon a Constitution "which has been negotiated between 
the Crown and Maori, one which brings about structural change to present constitutional 
structures." 101 This is interesting because as we will see blow Jackson opposes 
incorporation because the issue of Constitutional structures is very much at the heart of 
Maori opposition and though the question they are answering is different, it is apparent 
that both see the discourse on the Treaty as necessitating Constitutional change. 
97 Recording made 30 October 1997. 
98 Sec Appcndi:-; , Questionnain.: 1-1 . 
99 Sec Appcndi:-; , Questi onnaire 3. 
100 Sec J\ppendi:-; , Questi onnaire I. 
101 Sec J\ppcndi:-; , Questionnaire 2. 
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Henare also considered the issue of a Constitution as being the herald for change. Whilst 
not answering either way, in his view a "constitution comes from being a republic."
102 In 
this case the limitation of a written questionnaire is highlighted because there is little to 
indicate what more the Honourable Minister might have meant by this comment. For 
example one might consider that Henare is implying that only those countries that are 
republics, are eligible candidates for an entrenched Constitution . This position is 
untenable because as has already been noted Canada operates under a semi-entrenched 
Constitutional monarchy and is not yet a republic. 
The alternative interpretation available to Henare's comment 1s one submitted by 
Professor Brookfield . Brookfield sees "the coming republic as the occasion for basic 
constitutional reform that would establish in some form the dual Maori-Pakeha polities 
within New Zealand that [Kelsey] has long advocated."
103 Whether New Zealand will 
move to a republic is outside the scope of this paper, what is significant is that in a sense 
the republicanism debate might constitute the greatest mandate to revisit the issues of the 
White Paper. 
2. Submissions against 
Of those who opposed implementation only McMillan provides an indication as to 
reasoning and even then her opposition is equivocal. McMillan notes that "[i]f the powers 
that be cannot adhere to the present documentation it leaves no doubt that these 
situations need to be addressed first ."
10~ By this it is assumed that she desires for the 
Government to uphold those obligations stipulated by the various Articles of the Treaty. 
In a sense this is simply a restatement of why the Treaty might need to be incorporated -
because there is no enforcement mechanism for a violation of the State's duties. Graham 
summarises the situation that I suggest McMillan is trying to address by noting: 
105 
--what can perhaps be reasonably assumed \\·as that each party recognised 
10~ Sec J\ppcndi:,.;, Qucslio111wirc -1. 
103 F.M . Brookliclcl "REVOLUTIONS , RITJ·:Rl'.NDUMS /\NI) TI IE TREATY'' [ I 997] NZLJ 328,331. 
10-1 Sec J\ppcndi:,.;, Quc,liornwirc 9. 
io, D. Grnham '/RICK OR '/W:· .. 1n? ( Institute or Polic\' Studies, Wellington, I 997) I I . 
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that the future relationship between Maori and the Crown would very much 
depended on trnst. But it is probable Hobson knew, but Maori did not 
appreciate. that in the e\'ent of a breach of the Treaty by either party, the 
relatiYe positions of the parties would not be the same. If Britain were in 
breach. it \\Oulc! continue to exist sovereign power, but the loss to Maori 
Oo\\'ing from that bre;1ch \\'Ould not be able to be addressee! fairly unless 
Maori had somewhere to go to arg11e their case and to try to ensure further 
breaches did not occur. When this happened, to their dismay Maori soon 
found that there was no\\'here for them to go. and I consider that the failure 
to ensure the existence of an institution in which Maori could seek justice 
was one of the greatest acts of betrayal in New Zealand's history. It meant 
that not only were Maori e:,posed to the risks of unconscionable behaviour by 
the CrO\rn - \Yhich clearly occurred - but also that for a \'Cl)' long time they 
could do nothing about it.·· 
McMillan then goes on to state that "[p]erhaps there is no harm in working towards an 
[entrenched Constitution]" 106 and in doing so impliedly recognises that the only way 
towards Maori redress is the higher authority of an entrenched Constitution. 
C. Sltould Tlte Treaty Be Incorporated? 
1. Submissions agai 11st 
Kopu, Mi kaere, Henare, and Duff were opposed to the Treaty being incorporated into an 
entrenched Constitution. Joseph somewhat cynically has commented that "[s]ome drew 
from the Treaty a spiritual or mythical force which already constituted the Treaty to 
supreme law ... " 107 and this is stil l the case for three of the objectors. 
Kopu who opposed the idea of an entrenched Constitution itself, was equally opposed to 
h T b . . d. b 108 t e reaty e1ng 111corporate 111to any statute ecause: 
··1w·Je ha\'e had 150 lyearsJ plus 10 try and implement the ,Yairua of the 
Treaty agreement put in place for us to protect the future generations of 
Maoridom. There is no doubt that our Tipuna of the time saw us today. I can 
honestly say is a greM -grandmother. 1h,1t I cannot sec the same future 
gener:1tions. \\'hat " ·ith the imposition of other police and the I disposition] of 
a proud people. Whilst te Tiri ti o \Vai1;111gi renwins in its present form . we as 
Maori haYe a better chance of being here in charge of our future rather than 
read ing about ourseh·cs in the p,1st tense.'· 
lOoSccabO\'Cll 10-1. 
107 Sec above n 19, 62. 
108 Sec /\ppcndi:s: , Questionnaire 6. 
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Mikaere stated that: 109 
.. [t]hc Trcclly should form the basis of such a constitution. it should not be 
' incorporated into ' it, as this implies that the constitution is the framework 
into which the Treaty might be conveniently slotted." 
Henare's opposition was on the basis that the Treaty is "the founding document of this 
nation and as such shall have that [ constitutional] recognition. You don't need to 
incorporate the Treaty into another 'Treaty' or constitution."
110 
That the Treaty is the founding document of this country is not in dispute, however I am 
inclined to suppo1i Joseph's conclusion in that: 
111 
.. [c]laims that the Treaty is a 'founding ' or ·basic' document do not elevate it 
into supreme law, or indeed law simplicitcr. The Treaty lacks entrenchment 
or statutory adoption and wants for any judicial recognition as fundamental 
lmr ... 
Duff's opposition was on a completely different tangent to other three. He notes : 
112 
''I'd be bloody careful here I The can of worms ,rill surely turn to a colony of 
seething, ,·icious large snakes! If we fail to mature our thinking beyond 
'Maori ' and ' non-Maori ' ,re arc locking ourselves into a prison doing a 
generational life sentence of limited outlook and. thus. outcome. In 30--W 
years being 'Maori' will be meaningless" 
The latter part of this comment either perpetuates colonial notions of assimilation or 
more charitably, suggests that integration through cross-cultural 'breeding' is the future 
reality of this country. It appears for Duff like the adage 'if you remember the 60's, you 
weren't really there ' to suggest that if one in the future needs to ask 'how much Maori 
blood do you have?' the issue of 'Maori and ' non-Maori' is moot - and all that remains is 
a New Zealander. In this view Duff is not alone because the White Paper notes that "the 
Treaty gives legitimacy to the presence of pakeha, not as a conqueror or interloper, but 
as a New Zealand er, part of a new tangata whemia ."
113 
109 Sec nbol'c 11 IOI . 
110 Sccnbol'Cll 102. 
111 Sccnbol'e 19,62. 
112 Sec Appcn<li~ , Questionnaire I 0. 
113 See also F.M. 13rookficl<l in I.II. Kall'haru (ed.) 1/ 'aitangi: .\laori &Pake/,a Perspec/il'es of !he Treaiy of 
11'aita11gi (O~for<l University Press, Au<;k lnnd , 1989) 5. 
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2. S11h111issions infavo11r 
Interestingly a number of the written submissions desire incorporation because of the 
Treaty's status as the 'founding document' or because of its 'constitution-like' nature. 
For example Solomon notes simply that it should be incorporated "because it forms the 
basis of [New Zealand's] constitutional framework. Durie states: 
11
-1 
"As the foundation of the modern state. the Constitution should recognise the 
Treaty as a starting point. Some might argue that it is itself the Constitution. 
Howe,·er. it is a little light on detail to be the sole constitutional document." 
Phillips notes : 115 
·' Jn my Yiew the Treaty of \Vaitangi should be included in the Constitution as 
it is the founding document of this country. The Treaty cannot be ignored. 
An agreed set of principles should be renected in the Constitution itself, as 
the basis for founding constitut iona l changes to legislation. At present, the 
Treaty is inclucled on an act hoe and informal basis. in the legislatiYe process 
as Cabinet papers identify the implications of proposed policy 
recommendations in terms of the Treaty and all proposals for legislation 
must report on the consistency with Treaty principles. That. in my view. fails 
to giYe the Treaty its proper place in Government. That approach fails to 
address the broader issues of Maori disad,·antage in education, health, 
employment and \Yelfare dependency. " 
Therefore contrary to those views that Joseph cynically decries for drawing a 
constitutional status from the Treaty, these proponents consider (correctly) that such 
status is inherent within the Treaty, but needs to be affirmed through incorporation. The 
implication of this is that the Treaty cannot stand on its own as being sufficiently 
constitutional. 
Other respondents were in favour of recognition because "people have huge arguments 
over the [T]reaty and if it is incorporated then maybe these arguments can be settled."
116 
Anderson notes that "I think it should as far as landrights or fishing goes but I don't 
know enough about the Treaty to comment further ."
117 Darryn Huatahi was keen to see 
incorporation occur because "[b ]oth sides need equal speaking rights" 
118 and yet was 
114 Sec above n I 00. 
115 See above n 99. 
110 See Appendi:-; , Questionnaire 7. 
11 7 Sec Appcncli:-;, Questionnaire 8. 
118 Sec /\ppendi:-; , Queslionnairc 11 . 
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concerned that incorporation "could cause more friction between Maori and Pakeha."
119 
Rod Huatahi too wanted to provide "both sides an equal oppo11unity to put forward each 
[other's] point of view through a mediator .. '120 
Williams almost militantly considers incorporation as a weapon against the State. The 
Treaty should be incorporated : 121 
'·lt]o ensure in the end tlrn t Maori always lrn\'c a stick to beat the Crown with 
if it refu ses to comply \\ 'ith Treaty lprinciplcs·1. As matters currently stand 
there arc \'C ry fC\\· areas in which the Crown is bound by statute to act in 
compliance with the Trea ty. The Treaty settlement process relies on the 
·grncc and farnur ' of the Crown and thus is no real way to force a Maori 
oriented prospccti\'c into the process." 
Though smacking somewhat of Maori radicalism, Williams's submission states the very 
same principle espoused by Palmer when he discussed the implementation of a BOR.
122 
D. Wltat For111 Should Incorporation Take? 
1. A hrief explanation 
Two versions of the Treaty were signed on 6 February 1840 with the overwhelming 
majority of the Chiefs signing the Maori translation. There has been a lot of discussion in 
the past about the differences between the two texts and this paper does not intend to 
enter into that debate. However in the event that the Treaty is incorporated the question 
of what to incorporate is inevitable. 
In 1987 the Court of Appeal affamed that di scourse on the Treaty now employs the 
language of ' principles '. These principles are essentially that: 
123 
.. The Crown acquired soycrci gnty in C.\change for the protection of 
rangatirntanga: 1 ~-i 
That the Trea t~· requires a partnership nnd the duty to act reasonably and in 
110 Sec nbovc n I 18. 
120 Sec /\ ppcndi.\ , Questionnaire 12 . 
1
~
1 Sec /\ppendi.\ , Questionnaire I :l . 
122 See nbovc secti on 'F .\T/?J:".\'CJ /.I/ EST: !ntrot!11ctio11 " 
123 Sec nbove n --1 , :l5 I. 
12~ For discussion on thi s see T.11. Kmdwru (ed.) 1J'aiw11gi: i\faori &Pakeha Penpecrives of rhe Treary of 
/Vaitc111gi (O.\ford University Press, Auckl and, 1989) xix. 
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good faith, the responsibilities of the pnrtics being analogous to liducinry 
duties: 
The freedom of the Crown to govern for the whole community without 
unreasonable restriction: 
Maori duty of loyalty to the Queen. full acceptance of her Government 
through her responsible Ministers and reasonable co-operation; 
The duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to efTective 
protection of the Maori people in the use of their lands and other guaranteed 
taonga to the fullest extent practicable: 
The obligation to grant at least some form of redress for grievances where 
these arc csuiblishcd: 
Maori to retain chicftainship (rangatiratanga) over their resources and taonga 
and to lrn\'c all the rights and privileges of citizenship." 
The questionnaire implies that there are three options available. (1) That only one 
translation be incorporated; (2) that both versions be incorporated; (3) that the principles 
be incorporated. By way of conclusion to this brief history, Article 4(3) of the White 
Paper would have included both versions in the Schedule to the BOR. 
2. Incorporation f?l one te..xt 
Duff would not incorporate the Maori text "unless in context. " 125 This response in 
difficult to disseminate. What 'context' is appropriate? The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
notes "out of context without the surrounding words or circumstances and so not fully 
understandable." 126 For example Mikaere might consider that because nearly all the 
Chiefs signed the Maori version that the only appropriate context is the Maori translation. 
She very briefly states that "[t]he Maori text only should form the basis of a new 
Constitution ." 127 
One can only assume from Mikaere's brevity that she considers only the Maori version to 
have any worth or authority, but this clearly runs contrary to the bilateral nature of the 
Treaty in that it was signed between two parties. However it does leave open the 
125 Sceabovcn 112 . 
120 R.E. /\lien (ed .) TJ,e Concise Oxford Dic1iona1y of C111n'ni Eng/is/, (8 cd, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) 
248 . 
127 Sec abol'c 11 IOI . 
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possibility that even if the Maori version forms the basis of a new Constitution, could the 
English version be included as pa11 of the Constitution's development? 
Sinclair too would incorporate the Maori version: 128 
"The Mc1ori text must be the principal guide. 
The Maori text should be trnnsl;:ited into English. The [current] English text 
shou ld be thrown out. Cooke's ·principles· should be thrO\rn out becm,se 
they have on ly reduced the status or the Treaty or Wc1itangi , these principles 
hm·e been watered clown as the case lmv demonstrates EG: ( I 980's - l 990's). 
The basic rule in Treaty law. Contra tProrerentum] would insist that the 
English \·ersion be thrown out or only be referred to in a mininrnl wc1y." 
Part of this task has already been undertaken. Kawharu has translated the Maori text into 
English129 and this has been noted favourably by a number of commentators. 130 
However what is most significant is the notion of contra proferentum which holds that 
the interpretation given to a document should be that which is least favourable to the side 
which drew up the document. In this context it would indeed be the Maori version that 
prevailed rendering the English translation unnecessary save as a reference point - which 
is exactly Sinclair's point. 
3. Incorporation of hot/, te.xts 
Six of the responses preferred that both texts should be incorporated . Durie considered 
that "the original Main texts should form the foundation statement but operational 
implications might refer to the ' principles ' - as defined by the Waitangi Tribunal and the 
CoUI1s." 131 This position is much the same as Solomon.132 
··r would support both versions being entrenched but where there wc1s any 
conOict then the Maori \'ision would pre\·ail. It would also make practical 
seems to have the principles \\ hich lrn\'e de\·eloped over the lc1st decade used 
as a secondary le\·cl or interpretation where the meaning wc1s not clear from 
the plane words or the Treaty or di spute/uncertainty." 
McMillan ,vould incorporate both versions because it provides recognition of both parties 
128 Sec above n 98. 
12
'' Sec abol'C Knwharu , 3 19 - 320. 
130 for exmnplc D. Graham, sec above n I 06, 99 - IOI. 
131 Sec above n I 00. 
132 See /\ppcndix, Questionnaire 5. 
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to the Treaty. The "Maori [text] as it is the indigenous/native tongue of [New Zealand]" 
and the "English [text] as that is the mainstream language." 133 
4. Incorporation r~f't!te 'principles' 
Phillips notes that : rn 
"I l]l would be innppropriatc to adopt Justice Cooke's principles approach as 
stated in Ne 11' Zen/and J\fnori Council 11 A 1/orney-Genernl ( 1987). The 
principles of the Treaty as defined by the judiciary have always been 
confusing and unsatisfactory. Of more merit would be a consultative 
approach. ,,·ith a set of principles being agreed by consensus after a series of 
meetings and huis. The fundnmcntal principle is partnership and we need to 
C.\plorc ,,·hat ,,·c mean by partnership.'· 
In contrast Williams states: 135 
E. 
'·J have changed my mind on this in the last JO !years] . I now think that the 
focus should be had on the underlying principles - because the context 
within \\·hich the Treaty must be applied has changed so radically in 157 
!years]. Wording like 'The Crown shall at all times act toward Maori in a 
nrnnncr 1\'hich is consistent with the principles of the [Treaty of Wailangi]' 
would suit me ... 
Tire Perception Of Maori Opposition To Incorporation & Are Those 
Concerns Relevant In 199 7? 
1. Rationale behind t!te question 
It has previously been noted that there is a real lack of authoritative Maori commentary 
on the so-called opposition to incorporation at the time of the White Paper. Having 
drawn the conclusion that to suggest Maori would be opposed to any mention of the 
Treaty in an Act that purported to fulfil the same BOR function that Maori intimate the 
Treaty represents, it seemed appropriate to test this conclusion out. Again let me add that 
these questionnaires do not of themselves constitute 'authoritative' Maori commentary, 
but do represent a reasonable collection of Maori views. During this section Question 4 
and 5 will be considered together because the latter makes little sense unless the former is 
133 Sec 8bovc 11 I 0-1. 
131 Sec Appendi.\ , Questionn,1ire 3. 
135 Sec above n 12 I . 
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read with it. 
2. Tlte various views 
Jackson in a recorded interview qualified his ability to comment by stating: 136 
.. My \\'Ork li1kcs me on the road a lot. I like to think l\·e got a fairly good feel 
of\\ here our people arc coming from. But l don ' t think that things have that 
fundamentally changed since the debate on the Bill of Rights Act which was 
really the last time that l think this issue was discussed. 
I don ' t think that the reasons ha\'e changed that much either. The reasons 
that we gave in a hui of Maori lawyers and with Geoffrey Palmer were quite 
simple. 
He then went on to provide three reasons that they objected to incorporation. 
First : that the Treaty \\'as a bilateral agreement and that one party did not 
hm·e the right to unilatcrall~· either incorpora1e it . make it a nullity, or 
\\°lrnte\·er. 
The second \\'as: that the Crown should not incorporate or seek 10 rati(v by 
legislation the Treaty as a whole. until !he ongoing debate about what the 
Treaty means. its conte:--;t as a te:--;t \\·ithin the process of colonisation is 
clarified. 
The third reason that \\·e ga\'e was that. e\'en if it was ratified or incorporated 
in statute with an entrenched provision. there is no g1rnrantee under the 
Westminster system that it would be completely safe from change. 
What is apparent about Jackson's position is that the Treaty did not create a 
constitutional structure that intended for Maori to live in subordination to the Crown. 
Thus in Jacksonian terms, it might be said that the fiduciary duty that the Court of Appeal 
has noted as being a responsibility of the State, is in fact one that extends to both parties. 
In being a bilateral agreement, a horizontal or pluralistic constitutional structure was 
envisaged. That is envisaged by Maori , because the doctrine of Crown indivisibility and 
parliamentary sovereignty does not recognise such a notion. Notwithstanding these 
doctrines, for Jackson the Treaty should have provided an environment within which 
dialogue which possible. Therefore until proper communication between the parties was 
resolved there could be no accepting the Crown's proposal to incorporate. 
136 Sec abovl! n 97 . 
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The lack of Maori trust in the Government implicit in Jackson's third reason is a recurring 
feature of various written submissions. Mika ere states 
"Primarily that the all-white. all-male judiciary could not possibly be trusted 
to interpret the Treaty correctly. 
Also that statutory incorporation of the Treaty would in fact demean it, and 
render it liable to statutory repeal. " 
She observes that there has been no change because the "nature of the judiciary has not 
changed . The damage done by the judiciary with their interpretation of the principles of 
the Treaty is immeasurable." 
Williams opined that Maori considered the Treaty would be demeaned by 
· · 137 mcorporat1on: 
.. Maori opposition \\ as ill-ad\·ised and sentimental - in my view. They took 
the view that that treaty was too tapu lo be incorporated into law. The Crown 
undoubtedly couldn't bclie\·e it luck . Jn the event. a significant opportunity 
was lost to us ." 
Given this position, it is hardly surprising to find that he does not consider Maori 
concerns to be relevant today that in fact "entrenchment is needed all the more now as 
the Pakeha electoral pendulum swings back to the conservative viewpoints of the 
60's."13s 
Philips comments that : 139 
·'My understanding of Maori opposition to incorporation of the Treaty into 
the Ne\,· Ze:1land Bill of Rights Act 1990 m1s that it was a politicised 
response by a few tribal leaders and kau matua who in turn inOuenced Maori 
Members of Parliament. There 11·ere sc\·eral reasons for the Maori opposition: 
I) that the rnana of the Trea1y of \Vaitangi would be diminished by 
incorporation. This ,·ie\1· ha s merit as subsequent eYents re\'ealed that 
the Act \\·as not supreme law. 
2) That the rights contained in the Treaty could not be litigated. The 
Treaty would be a constitutional relic rather than a living document. 
3) Thal a growing sense of unease e.\isted in intellectual Maori circles 
\\ hich would not be addressed by the Labour [government]. " 
Q11estio11 5 
137 Sec nbovc 11 12 1, Quesl1011-l . 
138 Sec nbo\'e n 137, Question 5. 
13" Sec above n 99. 
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Yes the concerns arc still relevant and will need to be addressed. To Maori 
the Treaty is a li\'ing document. My ancestors signed the Treaty of Waitangi, 
Km\'ali, Paraha. Kaka and Tammi Waka Ncne. For Ngati Hine, for example, 
Kawati is the great warrior chief. To diminish the Treaty is to tread upon the 
\\·hcnua (land) and the \\'airua (spirit) of my ancestors without respect, 
carelessly and in ignorance of new hopes and aspirations for this country." 
Solomon considered that: 
'·Jt would depend on how the Treaty was entrenched and if it was 
accompanied by other constitutional reforms e.g. establishing an Upper 
House comprising equal numbers of Maori and Crown [representatives]. 
That way lthc] Treaty could only be repealed with support of both partners. 
There could be better ways of protecting the entrenchment provisions. In any 
C\'Cnt I still don ' t think the concern is completely valid as the common law 
docs not recognise the lTrcaty of \Vaitangi] unless it is incorporated into 
statute - so there would seem lo be little to lose in interpreting it. Even if 
Parliament could repeal the entrenchment pro,·ision. I doubt that this would 
effect the historic status of the Treaty ... 
Sinclair notes: 140 
"The reason why Maori opposed the incorporation of the Treaty into the 
!New Zealand] Bill of Rights Acts 1990 was. 
1) The Act could be repealed by simple majority 
2) The Treaty of Waitangi would therefore be in the vulnerable position 
of being \l'iped out completely 
3) Incorporation of the Treaty into an Act reduced the superior status of 
the Treaty ,, hich ,1as for Maori a sacred kawenata for ALL TIME, 
not something th rll could be tossed around at the 11·him of transient 
politicians.·· 
In another emphatic statement he is "absolutely!" convinced that these concerns are still 
relevant in 1997 for the following reasons: l.Jl 
1) "We arc ,1·itnessing a reduction if not an extinguishment of the rights 
inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi 18-W. 
2) Tangata \Vhenua rights arc inherent and Treaty law simply (gives] 
c.,prcssion lo them. 
3) Chief Judge Edward Durie speaks of Tangata \Vhcnua rights 
·springing from the e:1rth'. he uses the Latin term ·Lex silus' which 
spccific:!lly speaks of these rights . 
-I) Future Generations of Maori and non-Maori \\'ill find it essential to 
hm·e knml'ledgc of these constitutional issues \l'hich connects with a 
grml'ing global Indigenous Rights movement now finding voice at 
the United Nations. Gcneq1 and En\'ironmental forums , to name but 
11 few. 
140 Sec nbovc n 98 , Qucslion -! . 
141 Sec nbovc n 1-!0 . Question 5. 
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Any talk or establishing a Republic must first deal with the unfinished 
business of the Maori and Crown Partnership inherent in the Treaty of 
Waitangi ." 
Point 4 is something I would like to take up below because the issues both Sinclair and 
Duff raise are manifested in three of the responses. 
3. Those ruddy acade111ics 
Duff suggests that "none of the current trends reflect long term thinking - as can be 
expected and it's mediocrities, academics, theorists, self-serving consultants etc who are 
the debate." 1-12 Whilst vitriolic, this response is interesting because it suggests that the 
only people interested or concerned about issues of incorporation are the academics and 
so on and to a certain degree, Duff's response might be appropriate. If we bear in mind 
the responses from the likes of Darryn Huatahi , Marychurch and Anderson - young Maori 
males either attending or recently completed their college education - most of their 
responses indicated a considerable lack of informed opinion on the these issues. 
For example Huatahi simply responds "Don ' t know" to Question 4. Marychurch notes; 143 
"I' m not sure about Maori opposition and Maori ' s opposing the Treaty into 
the NZ Bill of Rights [A]ct but maybe Sir Geoffrey Palmer didn ' t know what 
he was talking about.'· 
As to whether those concerns are relevant he says "Maybe, if Sir Geoffrey 1s still 
alive." 1-1-1 
Anderson states honestly that he "wouldn't have a clue" about the nature of the Maori 
opposition at the time as does Darryn Huatahi 145, which is not surprising because not 
many people really do . However Anderson then either intuitively or accidentally stumbles 
upon this response. "Maybe Maori people had no trust in the government to hand over 
the Treaty to [be] filtered, tampered with etc." To Question 5 he simply notes "Pass". 
1
•
12 Sec above n I 12. 
1
•
13 Sec abovc n I 16, Qucsti on -1 . 
14
•
1 Sec above n 1-1:l , Quest ion 5. 
1
•
15 Dm,-yn 11Titcs "Don·t know. '' 
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Might I note that this comment is not intended to derogate from the views held by these 
young men, but to illustrate that what continues to be developed are a generation of 
young people who know very little about these issues. In this sense Duff's earlier 
comment that in "30 - 40 years "being a 'Maori' will be meaningless" 146 may be 
prophetic to the extent failing to properly educate will bring about this 'reality'. As far as 
Sinclair concern the future generation will have a knowledge of 'constitutional issues -
well the result here may possible speak for itself 
F. Further Co111111ents 
To finish the questionnaire responses let us look at the few submissions that availed 
themselves of the opportunity to make fu11her comments. Durie considers that 
"[e]ntrenchment and/or a Constitution for [New Zealand] should be preceded by a 
Constitutional debate - possibly by way of a Royal Commission." 147 
Mikaere states that we: 148 
.. require fundamental constitutio1rnl change. no amount of mere tinkering 
with the present Westminster system. e.g. by creating a ·constitution' as 
Pakeha lawyers understand that term will get Maori anywhere. It will merely 
allow Pakeha law to continue defining and denying Maori tino 
rangatiratanga." 
Philips advises that "the task ahead is essential if this country is to remain politically 
stable and secure." 149 Henare too looks to the future but notes that "[y]ou can't have a 
nation without a history, and you can't have a nation if it doesn't know where it has come 
~ d · · ,, 150 1rom an 1s go111g. 
Solomon in a pragmatic statement notes that any "entrenchment would need to take 
account of the obvious changes in the Treaty relationship since 1840 and the steps that 
1
•
1
'' Sec ahovc I ..J2 . 
147 Sec above 11 I 00. 
1
~
8 Sec above 11 10 1. 
1
•
19 Sec above 11 99. 
150 Sccabove11102. 
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have been taken to settle Treaty claims to date " 151 
Finally Sinclair says that "this whole area of tangata Whenua Rights needs wider debate 
especially in light of new economic trade agreements e.g. M.A.I which implicate 
resources which are potentially Maori-Twi resources if not existing Iwi resources." 
Sinclair notes that his thesis is on "Globalisation and Maori" which for a fuller 
explanation of his final comment would be an appropriate source. 
G. Summary 
Of fourteen written submissions, ten suppo11 the implementation of an entrenched 
Constitution, one provides no indication either way, and three oppose the proposition. 
Even allowing for the limited sample these responses represent, they nonetheless indicate 
that there has been a fundamental shift from submissions stating essentially that 'we are 
opposed to this BOR'. 
The perception of Maori concerns at the time of the White Paper debates were generally 
that maori did not trust the Government to Act properly on their behalf Maori were 
purpo11edly concerned that the Treaty's special status would be derogated from by 
incorporation both because of its incorporation and the suggestion that the House of 
Representatives could alter or tamper with the wording of the treaty. 
In some respects the tampering concerned can be laid to rest by the suggestions that have 
emerged in relation to Question 2. For example Philips' approach which would 
incorporate basic new principles with 'partnership' as the precept provides for a new 
paradigm which already indirectly tampers with the Treaty because the it might then be 
reduced to a historical document in light of the new arrangement. The Treaty remains the 
same, but the constitutional foundation is now shifted. 
However it is also clear that the majority of the respondents with ten in favour and four 
151 See nhovc n I 08 . 
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against. This seems to confirm the submission made earlier that Maori desired some 
statutory recognition of the Treaty in a constitutional document and thereby making it a 
fundamental part of the Constitution. 
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Part Pour 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Solomon correctly noted that a significant opportunity for Maori was lost when the 
Treaty was not incorporated into the NZBORA. There has been an undercurrent of 
discussions that suggest the next oppo11unity for Maori may arise during the debate on 
republicanism. I submit that this view derogates from potential inherent in Constitutional 
discourse 1l'ilho111 reference to republicanism. Canada, which in many respects has shared 
a similar constitutional development as New Zealand, has since 1982 operated as a 
Constitutional monarchy without becoming a republic . It is a working model that with the 
inevitability of this country's move towards an entrenched Constitution can be considered 
in order to learn from their experi ences. 
The role of the Treaty is a fundamental part of the constitutional discussion. Perhaps 
unfairly, Maori have been shouldered with the ' blame' or 'responsibility' for the Treaty's 
exclusion from the NZBORA. It is granted that there were concerns expressed by Maori 
about incorporation and as evidenced by the questionnaires, many commentators are of 
the opinion that those concerns a as valid in 1997 as they were in 1987. 
I would conclude this paper by submitting that the time has come for talk. Kanohi ki te 
kanohi - face to face. There are many issues to be dealt with but they will not go away 
simply because nothing is said. 
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I. 
(04) 388-9726 a 10/11/1997 18:14:42 
Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wel lington, 1997 
. . 
I. 
Do you think that New Zea~n~hould implement an entrenched Constitution? 
~k Yes. 7h£,, w#>M'.wvL Gu'V't«.fi,~0 ~ J{u,4 
c:l,eJuvJ ~ ~~ twv ~~ ~1 &,1<u.0~ 
2. Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please 
outline reasons. 
Iµ fl__ i ~u~/~ I ~w-v _ffrc4_,; fkc 
/
f&;J J , . ~ ± I ( I~ 
Iv._ ~~jy,.,._ . d:Je4W" ' lf---rj q, C':-1:f~ 
/;kl ~ 1k ~ ~UJ ~
3. Please explain your answer. If you answered 'Yes' to Question 2, what form should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively should 
we adopt Cooke's 'principles' approach? 
Que111in Duff, 
41 Camperdown Road, Miramar, Tel/Fax 388-9726, 
Email Q Duffextra.co.nz 
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Quentin Duff (04) 388-9726 10/11/1997 18:14:42 p. 2 
4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
Tl<A,/---ii fu-tv .(!)-µ.~ -'lt,a c4u~vv cf!L ~ 
tJ · (v,~ ~ ~u~fL I, 
u1 ft 'ft__ M ~ kk_ ~ . 
I 
5. In your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons. 
JJ& ~'~~+--if J!,t,,i,'PMA~t4tf 
~~~ .~Utt~ ~_e-t; 
ey-f((Q__ ~~l~ -~ k _(~ 
Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
~/n <v ~u~ ~ l();z_ 
~~A_, ~Id~~~~ 
l IVl O ff • 41/k ( E. of i~Vj 
---r-+---_,...oc:::...--1-___:_ ____ -,,,,,::.::.i-__ 
fh·0 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duffpem1iss· n to publish into a thesis, any and 11 of the comments I have 
made within this questionnaire. 
Woultz;7~7·e a proof of those co/(2 or tod:;n? ~ D No 
1 (dat~ ~----(-sig- n-at-ur_e_) ---
Queruin Duff, 
4 J Camperdown Road, Miramar, Tel/Fax 388-9726, 
Email QDuj]@xtra co.112 
3 
p. 2 
ty 
y 
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Io 
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z. 
Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997. 
1. Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution? 
'\es.., ~ o ."~ o,(L v--i\r.,~\.-,. ~s \o~,,.__ ~a~ lo~ ~ 
c.~'-"" <AAc\ Mevv,.__; 
1 
o"4- wkh \or~,; ,::;\.laovJ s~ 
c_,\r..,v,t-- b. f!X_~uJ-- 0 ·""'-g,,~i.,_¥'.cJ N~~, 
2. Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please outline 
reasons. 
h k)l~lS ~ 5,;vL(,l--_ °' 
~ ~ ,, • ( ,'\S-0'' f)~ VJ;,, 'J-
I ~ L<,,-\.._s~~\./\. ; s (1.,.-Q_ 
3. If you answered ' Yes' to Question 2, what form should such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and Maori texts be incorpornted? Alternatively should 
we adopt the 'principles' approach of the court (See New Zealand Maori Council v 
Minister o.f Finance [1987]? 
i1"{_ Mt{o- . kl'-l- ()~~ j~~ h ~ botr 
~ ~ I~ 0Y,._ s \'"'\,~k.~ 
4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty into 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer. 
What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? 
;< Pr''°"'""'~ r""-·-J- -(1,"- ~ JU~ I ~ l'·'\<,"-.,li.._ J\ACL. C-\.~ 
( ,0v,. \ cJ ~ - f;:, ') <-,, 6 \.,,\ \/~ ~ ~,\ h:i v.:U.,· p r-ul ~ 
( N .J~ (.ct.-e.L~ . 
M" " h."t,'_J· 
V'- ~0\-
s~~"j 
5. Jn your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons . 
'-\('.) ~ 1/ \o,...,l,~ 1 n,'4_ Jv-Glc. 1 ~ ha. ) . ~ C~\O'r. 
1h J-c~V'-.0-cf ~ '°j ll~ J v-<'.L 0."i/l vV~ ·ih..u:.r-
(-~f/~hl~ a{ ,, ~ p .-v-.. u--{~ o{ n~ rce~·c tS 
I /"Y'-~<A-0 vV~ 
6. Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
K.•1 IA• /''-JL 
e j .t., j U'4c'1;~ o. 
\,v"-{:~ \ 7:/~ ~ 
~~ r~ 
Disclosure Agreement 
I A rv,,1,i- 0. µ \ '<- t\ G:,!l.c.:.. 
(name) 
t(MAJ 
~S~,'il\fa·- .syJ~, 
f ~(,.~ {"'"'1 Q.A/\....,) 
cr-t f'vla.ur, t\/J'-( v'J~v'( ' l ~ v,I JJ 
CV~~~ J.y~"-~ ,. ~~ 
o f. _ ___;:._t,v=---'11....;;..\_LA-1'Q-'--=---"l....,/Tu:v<....l-><C-"'------"S..,.<, .... ti::Q:5=.......,,.'--'":.....,..c:L::.......i... __ _ 
(organisation) 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all of the comments I have 
made within this questionnaire. 
Would you like to receive a proof of those comments prior to publication? ~Yes D No 
(.( /t( ;91 
1 l 
(date) 
into 
timer. 
have 
] No 
Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
::i,epareo by Quentin Dutt 
LLM Student . '!ictona University of We1llngton . 1997 
Do you think that ~e"v Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution·) 
3. 
It is important for the political stability of New Zealand
 that 
an entrenched Constitution is implemented. There ~s an ex
pectation 
that such a Constitution would be implemented after carefu
l 
research on other countries constitutions (such as Germany
 and 
Canada) and wide consultation within New Zealand. 
... Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution·) Pleas
e 
outline reasons . 
In my view the Treaty of Waitangi should be included in th
e 
Constitution as it is the founding document of this count
ry. 
The Treaty cannot be ignored. An agreed set of pr~nciples
 
should be reflected in the Constitution itself, as the ba
sis for 
founding constitutional challenges to legislation. At pre
sent, 
the Treaty is included on an ad hoe and informal basis, in
 the 
legislative process as Cabinet papers identify the implic
ations 
of proposed policy recommendations in terms of the Treaty 
and all 
proposals for legislation must report on the consistency w
ith 
Treaty principles. That, in my view , fails to give the T
reaty 
its proper place in Government. That approach fai:s to ad
dress 
the broader issues of Maori disadvantage in education, he
alth, 
employment and welfare dependency. 
_) Please explain your answer lf you answered ·Yes· ro Question:::. '.\hat form s
houid 
such incorporation rake·, 
For example should both English and \laori texts be incorporated ') .-\ lternarively shou
ld 
\,Ve adopt Cooke·s ·principles· approach·) 
As I have addressed the question of incorporation jeing an
 
agreed set of principles and the Treaty itself (Macri and 
English versions) as an appendice, I will not address t~e 
principles approach . It would be inappropriate to adopt J
ustice 
Cooke's principles approach as stated in NZ Maori Council 
v 
Attorney-General (1987). The principles of the Treaty as 
defined by the judiciary have always been confusi~q and 
unsatisfactory . Of more merit would be the consul~ative 
app r oac h, with a set of princi?les being agreed by consen
sus 
af ter a series of meetings and huis. The fundame~~al prin
c~?l c 
is partnershi ? and we need to explore what we rnea~ by 
?artnership . 
'dtt, •111111 I m;f 
1 / <.1 1111/1t 'r ri1,1n1 f<o/11/ . . lltr1tll//tr fi'l1/-i 1.r .-iHH_1J- ..!<; 
/:'111111/ tj I Jt1/}U1J.\·tm c·1, 11;: 
--
-+. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the NeH· Zealand Bill qf Righrs .kr 1990. when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time') Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
My understanding of Maori opposition to incorporation of the 
Treaty into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was that 
it was a politicized response by a few tribal leaders and kau 
matua who in turn influenced Maori Members of Parliament. There 
were several reasons for the Maori opposition: 
1) that the mana of the Treaty of Waitangi would be diminished 
by incorporation. This view has merit as subsequent events 
revealed that the Act was not supreme law. 
2) That the rights contained in the Treaty could not be litigated. 
The Treaty would be a constitutional relic rather than a living 
document. 
3) That a growing sense of unease existed in intellectual 
Maori circles which would not be addressed by the Labour govt. 
5. In your opinion. are the above concerns still relevant in l 997'J Please give reasons. 
Yes, the concerns are still relevant and will need to be address e d. 
To Maori the Treaty is a living document. My ancestors signed 
the Treaty of Waitangi, Kawati, Paraha, Kaka and Tamati Waka Nene . 
For Ngati hine, for example, Kawati is the great warrior chief. 
To diminish the Treaty is to tread upon the whenua (land) and the 
wairua (spirit) of my ancestors without respect, carelessly and 
in ignorance of new hopes and aspirations for this country. 
6. Do you have any further comments that may be relevant') 
The task ahead is essential if this country is to remain 
politically stable and secure. 
Disclosure Agreement 
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(name) (organisation> 
PO Box 600, Wellington 
(address) some 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis. ~mmfarld of the comments I have 
made within thi s questionnaire.with acknow ledgme nt of the source . 
Would you like ro recei ve a proof of those comments prior to publication ') _ Yesx.x~ 
~~~~ ·l %- I\ - q 1 (datel (Signature) 
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3. 
Entrenchment of' the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997. 
Do you think that New Zealand should implement an cn1rcnchcd Constitution? 
4-~~~~ ~~ c_ /<Lfw/:J fc_ I;_ ~ VI~ 
Should the Treaty o l'Waitangi he i ncorporakd into such a Constitution? Please 
outline reasons . 
4 
If. 
Please explain your answer. lf you answered · Y cs ' to Question 2. what fonn should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should hoth English and vfaori texts he incorporated? Alternatively should 
we adopt Cooke's ' principles' approach? 
( ) llf'1//.i11 1)1.I[/; 
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, ,. h"nare New Zealand First 
4. 
5. 
There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation ol' the Treaty 
into the Ne1,v Zealand L?ill o/R.ights .... lc:t 199(), when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if ncccssmy. 
/fr r ~~~ iv 
In your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons . 
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6. Do you have any fu1thcr comments that may be relevant? 
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made within this questionnaire. 
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(date) ;lft-/( /V,ti · /"'i.,,,"' l)uj]; ~ . ·t-H-J.u.r"---------.. 
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Entren61tment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
, Prepil1'8d 'a:f Quentin Dutt 
LLM St~t. V'"ictorin Umversit-; of Wellington, 1997 
1. Do you think that New~ should implement :Ul cntl'cnchcd Constitution? 
2 . Should !he Treaty ol'Wai\angi ht, incorporated into such a Conslilution? Ph,ase 
outline r~aS<ms. 
l/-es - ~ ~ ~~ ~ f ;;.,-v, J h-e bur ; .r Pj ~ f'I Z 's 
{,,,AA J hk kev\J ~e,<AI ,r-1-- . 
3. Please explain your~. lfyou A.nSwcrcd 'Yes' k') Question 2, wlrnt fo1m should 
$UCh incorporation tnkc? 
For example should hoth Engti1.h and Maori texts he incorporal~d? Altcma!ivdy should 
we atlopl Cookt,'s 'principle11' appmach? 
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4. There has hoon a e<>mmtJ~eption that Maori oppolle<l incorporation or the Trt:aly 
into the N£:w 'L,c;aland Bill o(HJl(hl:, Acl 1990, when originally proposed by Sir ( icotTt·cy 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opp1,,"'>sition at that time'/ Please use more 
paper if nccossnry. 
ln your opinion, ar~ the alfove concerns still rd~vanl in 1997? Ph::a~ g1 vt: masons . 
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Entrenchment of~ the Treaty 
Qu.estionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997 
l. Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution? 
£. 
2. Should the Treaty ol'Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please 
,. 
outline reasons. 
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z.,i:(w// Q//./-.:r;;,hJ?)_xJ' / r ~ ./:/'J_/ Jv/..4~ h/' .:..' t?..-- . • .. 
3. Please explain your answer. lf you answered · Y cs ' to Question 2, what tonn should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and ~faori k:xls be incorporakd? Allernalivdy should 
we adopt Cooke's 'principles· approach? 
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4. There has hccn a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation or the Treaty 
into the Ne1,v 'Lea/and Bill o/'l?.ights .·'lc:t 1990. when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if ncccssaiy. 
5. Tn your opinion, arc the ahovc concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons. 
6. Do you have any fu1thcr comments that may be relevant? 
Disc/OSUf9 Agf9BmBnt 
T 
(name) 
or --------------------(organisation) 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all or the con1111cnls T have 
made within this questionnaire. 
Would you like lo receive a prool'orthosc COllllllcnts prior to publication') n Yes n No 
(date) (signature) 
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Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington , 1997. 
1. Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution? 
tJo 
2. Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please 
outline reasons . 
\ 
a rn11-tV'Af i 1 f5 
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st+rted. 
3. Please explain your answer. If you answered ' Yes ' to Question 2, what form should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively should 
we adopt Cooke' s ' principles ' approach? 
Q1w11ti11 1>11.U; 
41 CamjJf>l·r/011111 Ro<1d, Mimmar, Tel/Fa.x 388-97 26, 
/:"mail QD11.U@xtm.co.11z 
4. 
5. 
6. 
There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the New Zealand Bill c?f Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary b. + M . rr() c) $t h I' ll\l\ V1 trf--,51) V'e a o (11 °' u V' I 6 r. ' . 
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Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
Disclosure Agreement 
1 L.e.-v'! IY01.f::fhv V'f..,,li\ 
(name) 
of '{ U <I' II\ QOi'\~D ~j [0 \ /i vj'f 
(org- nisat1on) · 
'3'5 LO, v 'i /·"10t I 5, h 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all .of the comments I have 
made within this questionnaire. 
Would you like to receive a proof of those comments prior to publication? I I Yes r l No 
(date) (sign ure) 
Q11e11ti11 D11.D; 
4 J Camperdot/111 Noa.d, Mimmar, 'J 'el/Fa.x 388-97 26 , 
Email Q.D11.D@xtm.co.11z 
J 
lty 
:y 
0sth 
~g(h 
- t'Yltt~ 
Ov \) 
~' l f 
1ave 
No 
3 
1. 
Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington , 1997. 
Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution? 
8. 
2. Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please 
outline reasons. 
/ 7/~/ /Yt IT' 0f1ou l() . It Mi? ft:; l/JrvJ?tcr-; JJ [/ f JI'm1v{_7 
t(J; ) ~r ( Prx\J; · /JLc)t ~ }"f\f) v &r-f Af!Ol{ r /fk 11?:?r-,; 
/0 (offrrwvr ~ t;tt,~ . 
3. Please explain your answer. If you answered ' Yes ' to Question 2, what form should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both Engli sh and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively should 
we adopt Cooke' s ' principles' approach? 
f~ S- tD/(t 1rf' iJtl( t{fl/([I\/ M?r 7::UCL V /'f_(Uf!lrf_' 
Q1w11ti11 Duff, 
41 Cam/)<>rr/01/111 Rolld, Miramar, Tel/Fax 388-97 26 , 
Limai/ Q.D11.D@xtra.co.11z 
4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the New Zealand Bill qf Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
(;vvut ()~ )_, Hlf t2 fl (llll · ff/ffl/f;c:; (ntof ( {fDf LCZ /1)1) 
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5. In your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons . 
6. Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
!VltiH I 
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I ({1/)?V~ ,4v;~\-e, ('v or fiiN/&,tfa2 i,~r ( /-tvC,tl H 
(name) 
!~ J L/ J2fhu);ft~ v ft 
. (organisation) 
-~ l - ,i _s7;? ff {)-j i(YC{K[I 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duff permi ssion to publish into a thesis, an y and all of the comments I have 
made within thi s questionnaire . 
Would Y.°{1 like to receive a proof of those comment s prior to publication? I I Yes [ No 
?f)trf( qq I 9(1fvdY~ 
(date) (signature) 
Quentin U11f;; 3 
41 Camf.xm/011111 Road, M iramar, 1'e// //(l,Y 388-9726 , 
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Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prspared try Quentin Dutt 
LLM Studem. Victoria University of Wel1inaton , 1997. 
,. 
3. Please explain your answer. If you answered ·Yes' to Question 2, what form should 
su h incorporation take? 
F example should both English and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively should 
w adopt Cooke's 'principles' approach? 
' 
Y(s ~!( kxl h kt VV\ UH ?,,__,,,,/t'c/. 
/lllct@? ; d ' 1k I 1.-to/, f {A,..St., Sf, ,rf / U l a~ ,~ 
h~7uR_ N · ;2 . 
tvi9!1 ~ a c; Aai If ftu__ /vtA!', .fh-L~ 
!7~,1,, 
t,.,>ue•,-lfln VUJf 
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4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
5. 
6. 
int the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act /990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
P mer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
pa er if necessary. 
In your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in t 997? Please give reasons. 
Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
D sc/osul'8 Agrsement 
I M rJf "1,11 4f '- fl11t,-<-~ 
/J (name) 
1~o &x $1S,)O 
(organisation) 
(address) 
g nt Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all of the comments I have 
m de within this questionnaire. . 
uld you like to receive a proof of those comments prior to publication? ~s D No 
(date) 
./l/tt~ , Tsfunatura> 
Quentin Du.ff, 
4 J Camperdown Rood, Mlmmar, Tel/Fax 388-97 26, 
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Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire ~--~-· ~~~~~~--=~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~ 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Studgnt, Victoria University of Wellington. 1997. 
1. Do you think that New Zealand should implwient an entrenched Constitution·., 
ye. f 'I /,; ~ ~ c;,{ ; r:e.' C ......_ U- : f\ 0 i_ ['S !-or i C... "'> I f I' e C ~ ,).-e.,.._+--/ 
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2. Should the Treaty ofWaitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Please 
outline reasons. 
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Please explain your answer. If you answered 'Yes· to Question 2, what fom1 should 3. 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively should 
we adopt Cooke ' s 'principles ' approa.ch? 
N o Mc:.\,.D ,,, 1' k . -.,e_ c.- t.A._,---. Gz--1 r ·, "' 
Querztin Duff, 
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4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
111to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
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S. In your opinion, are the above concerns stilJ relevant in 1997? Please give reasons. 
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Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
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(name) ---------------(organisat ion) 
(address) 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all of the comments I have 
made within this questionnaire. 
Would you like to receive a proof of those comments prior to publication? D Yes [ No 
(date) (signature) 
Quenrin Du.If, 
41 camperctown Road, Mtrr7mar, Tel/Fax: 38S-9726, 
Ernatl QDujftbxrra.co nz 
TOTf'.'ll... P.01 
eaty 
rey 
~e 
/' 
.e I 
' 
s. 
have 
I No 
... ... 
P.01 
1. 
2. 
Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997. 
Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution?
 
Yc5 
Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Pleas
e 
outline reasons. 
//~ 
YeJ .-- Bed tnis ccutd cou:te rnore f(!Cf ,.-on betwten 
rna or i um PCt R?1'1A 
eon~ JtC{eJ neecJ el(;UOI JPEDP)n9 r19n+J 
3. Please explain your answer. If you answered ' Yes' to Question 2, what form sho
uld 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both English and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternative
ly should 
we adopt Cooke ' s 'principles' approach? 
Yes- 1~cfln 'IT) The rnoo1'1 0(7CI ry1p tY~~ li')ln. 
Q1w11ti11 Duff, 
41 Camperdm/111 Road, .Mimmar, Tel/Fax 388-9726, 
Hmail Q.D11.U'<-cxtm.co.11z 
4 . There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the New Zealand Bi/1 '<f Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
DC17 J- r-r r01; 
5. In your opinion, are the above concerns still relevant in 1997? Please give reasons. 
6 . Do you have any further comments that may be relevant? 
Disclosure Agreement 
1 Wf(~r H0a fa !71 
v 
(address) L/ 
grant Quentin Duff permission to publish into a thesis, any and all of the comments I have 
made within this questionnaire . 
Would you like to receive a proof of those comments prior to publication? I] Yes r l No 
, ., _r" _--., - a 7 J I__ .-
------
l date) (signature) 
Q111!11li11 D11JJ; 
41 Camperr/011111 Noad, Miramar, Tel/Fa:x:388-9726 , 
Email QD11jJ@xtm.co.11z 
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Entrenchment of the Treaty 
Questionnaire 
Prepared by Quentin Duff 
LLM Student, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997. 
I. Do you think that New Zealand should implement an entrenched Constitution
? 
' Y r-<.::, 
2. Should the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into such a Constitution? Plea
se 
outline reasons. 
12. 
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3. Please explain your answer. If you answered ' Yes ' to Question 2, what form 
should 
such incorporation take? 
For example should both Eng li sh and Maori texts be incorporated? Alternatively sho
uld 
we adopt Cooke ' s ' principles' approach? 
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Q11e11ti11 Duff, 
41 Cwnperdo11111 Road, Mimmar, 'f "el/ fia:x: 388-9726 , 
Emoil Q.D11.D@:x:tra .w .11z 
4. There has been a common perception that Maori opposed incorporation of the Treaty 
into the New Zealand Bill qf Rights Act 1990, when originally proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer. What is your understanding of Maori opposition at that time? Please use more 
paper if necessary. 
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